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Despite some of the most comprehensive legislation protecting the rights
of Americans with disabilities, in 2012 the United States Senate voted
against the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).1 The CRPD would have made explicit
many new rights and freedoms for persons with disabilities around the world.
However, disabilities, and in particularly mental health, have been a focus of
discussion amongst policymakers and the general public in the United States
and elsewhere, as relates to gun control and individuals with mental health
disorders.2 This Article argues that the evolving definition of disability
should enable persons with disabilities (both physical and mental), who were
unable to do so before, to seek asylum and/or refugee status under the 1951
Refugee Convention.3
Since its inception in 1951, the Refugee Convention’s definition of what
constitutes refugee status4 has been the subject of debate and varying
interpretation. Most common law jurisdictions have looked to international
human rights law either as a comprehensive framework to adjudicate asylum
claims or as an interpretive tool.
To gain refugee status, an applicant must show not only that he or she is
outside their country of nationality but also has a well-founded fear of
persecution due to one of five enumerated grounds (race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group).
Disabled applicants have struggled with (1) demonstrating that their fear
is well-founded under both objective and subjective criteria, (2) proving that
the conduct at issue rises to the level of “persecution”; and (3) linking their
fear of persecution to their membership in a particular social group.

1

U.N. treaty on disabilities falls short in Senate, Brian Montopoli / CBS News/ December
4, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57557077/u.n-treaty-on-disabilities-falls-sh
ort-in-senate/.
2

Laura Meckler & Jack Nicas, Spotty Records Weaken Background Checks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2013,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595704578244153323 837058.html.
3 Randal C. Archibold, Abuses Found at Mexican Institutions for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/world/americas/01mexico.html.
4 Asylum and refugee status are often conflated and both determinations are made under
the same legal standard that requires persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. However, those seeking refugee status typically must apply while outside both their
country of nationality and the host country. Asylum-seekers must be in the host country or
applying for admission at a host country port of entry. Another distinction is that a refugee is
an asylum-seeker whose application has been successful. In this Article, both asylum-seeker
and refugee are used to denote those persons who have left their country of nationality and are
seeking legal entry or status in a host country.
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This Article examines the human rights and social approaches to
understanding “disability” and argues that the CRPD supports both
approaches, which in turn facilitate a showing of persecution on grounds of
membership in a particular social group. While so-called socio-economic
rights have rarely been the basis of successful applications for asylum, the
CRPD and the evolving definition of disability shifts the focus from more
traditionally acceptable bases for asylum such as torture and the physical threat
to life, and enables applicants to make claims based on deprivation of other
basic human rights. Although some of the challenges faced by applicants with
disabilities, will be mitigated by the CRPD and its more inclusive approaches
to understanding disability, relying on the CRPD will not open the floodgates
and greatly increase the number of asylum seekers with disabilities.
Part I establishes the utility of a human rights framework and the CRPD
for adjudicating asylum claims. Part II shows how the CRPD has expanded
the definitional constraints of “disability,” primarily through a human rights
and social approach to understanding the concept. Part III summarizes new
proposals to show the objective and subjective elements of well-founded
fear. Part IV argues that under the CRPD’s human rights model of disability,
persons with disabilities will have a lower burden in showing persecution.
Finally, Part V demonstrates how the CRPD’s social approach to
understanding disability helps to show that persons with disability comprise
a “particular social group,” in contemporary asylum adjudication.
I. USING A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK TO ADJUDICATE ASYLUM CLAIMS
[M]en walked around half-naked, feces littered a yard,
bedsheets were missing, the smell of urine permeated a day
room, bathroom faucets malfunctioned and patients lay
sprawled on several patches of grass . . . elderly women sat tied
to wheelchairs, staff members hustled to clean soiled floors as
investigators moved through, and patients and their caretakers
could not fully explain how or why they were institutionalized.
A trembling blind woman said she had been raped by a staff
member—who officials said was dismissed during a criminal
investigation—and would feel safer on the streets. “I don’t
have any hope,” she said. “I don’t have a nickel to get out of
this place.”5

5

Archibold, supra note 3.

2014]

THE CRPD AND ITS IMPACT ON REFUGEE AND ASYLUM LAW

691

A New York Times reporter wrote of these deplorable findings at a
Mexican mental health institution in November 2010.6 Two years later, in
November 2012, the same reporter wrote of similar violations in Guatemala:
Children and adults were abused at the hospital, basic medical
care was denied and women were subjected to sex trafficking,
often controlled by guards from the national police and gang
members given access to the hospital from an adjacent
prison . . . . Patients lay about on the ground in dirty or tattered
clothing, while others were tied to chairs and beds in dank,
dreary buildings—freshly scrubbed for the inspection, it
appeared, by the suffocating scent of bleach—or wandered
around with no purpose or attention . . . A woman locked in an
isolation cell moaned in confusion, and staff members reported
shortages of medicine and inconsistent care by doctors.7
Not much appears to have changed in the past two years, or even the past
ten years when reporters found similar conditions in a Mexican asylum.8
Such blatant violations of fundamental human rights are a primary
concern of international refugee law, whose main purpose is to protect
individuals who are vulnerable to human rights violations and are not
adequately protected by his/her own government.9 The definition of refugee
is a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the

6

Id.
Randal C. Archibold, Commission Calls for Guatemala to Protect Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/americas/commission-calls-for-gu
atemala-to-protect-patients.html?_r=0.
8
Just as we walked in, 15 naked women were being marched toward us, and
we backed away, to give them privacy. But the naked women paraded past,
to a hallway where a male attendant stood beside the shower room. There, as
hospital workers came and went in the hall, the 15 naked women squatted,
shivering, their arms folded over their breasts for warmth, waiting to shower.
Standing nearby, the ward nurse, Oliveria Garcia, explained, “Most days, we
may have two towels for 98 women.”
Michael Winerip, The Global Willowbrook, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, 6 (Magazine), at 63.
9 James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection, 4 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 113 (1991).
7
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protection of that country.”10 Professor James Hathaway breaks down this
definition into practical terms. In practice, a person seeking refugee status
must demonstrate that (1) he/she is outside his/her country of origin; (2)
he/she has a well-founded fear, which involves both an objective and
subjective determination of that fear; (3) the fear is of being persecuted (i.e.,
experiencing sufficiently serious harm); and (4) the persecution is primarily
due to his/her race, religion, nationality, political opinion or for belonging to
a particular social group.11 These latter three elements are often difficult for
refugees to prove, and the high burden of proof means that many potentially
valid claims are either denied or subjected to excessive scrutiny.12 Applying
the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in
framing the claim for refugee status alleviates this burden.
A. Relationship between International Human Rights Law and International
Refugee Law
International human rights law, its treaties, conventions, and customs are
closely related to international refugee law. The treaty bodies that constitute
international refugee law are the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Optional Protocol.
Most states have
incorporated them into domestic legislation (such as the Immigration and
Nationality Act or INA in the United States),13 to establish the legal
framework applied by adjudicators to asylum claims. In the United States,
the asylum program, which consists of an affirmative and defensive
application for asylum (to be discussed below), is overseen by the
Department of Homeland Security’s United States Customs and Immigration
Services (USCIS) and the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR).
The general instrumentalities of international human rights law are: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Although the UDHR is
non-binding in nature, it remains an influential source globally. Several
human rights instruments deal with specific “vulnerable parties” (i.e., the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
10 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1A, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter Refugee Convention].
11 Hathaway, supra note 9, at 113.
12 Id.
13
8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 INA 208.
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Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child or (CRC)).
These instruments provide several explicit protections against physical and
psychological harm that could befall their respective constituents.
One of the oldest and most fundamental protections contained in
international human rights instruments is the prohibition of torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.14 This prohibition is a rule of special
character in international human rights law, from which no derogation is
permitted. In other words, even when certain elements of a treaty are
breached by a signatory state, the clause or provision prohibiting torture may
not be breached.15 The prohibition against torture is treated as customary
law (or a jus cogens norm) by the global community and is respected even
when it is not explicitly codified in treaty or legislation.16 Every human
rights instrument contains an anti-torture provision,17 and the prohibition
against torture has even merited a specialized convention, dealing with the

14

Janet E. Lord, Shared Understanding or Consensus-Masked Disagreement? The AntiTorture Framework in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 33 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2010).
15 Id. at 33 & n.26
The jus cogens status of the torture prohibition has been recognized by the
Committee against Torture, the treaty body that monitors the Convention
against Torture, and provides authoritative interpretations of CAT
obligations. . . . Judge [Rosalyn] Higgins, in discussing the legal character of
the UDHR, states: “[T]he suggestion has been made that human rights
treaties have the character of jus cogens. There certainly exists a consensus
that certain rights-the right to life, to freedom from slavery or torture-are so
fundamental that no derogation to them is permissible. And international
human rights treaties undoubtedly contain elements that are binding as
principles which are recognized by civilized States, and not only as mutual
treaty commitments.” Internal citations omitted.
16 Id. (citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga
Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63–74 (1996)).
17 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 5; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR];
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S.
3, art. 14; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, art. 11; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 24; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, May 3, 2008,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15 [hereinafter CRPD]. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 2005), states: “No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Regional human rights instruments echo the same statements. For example, Article 5 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144, U.N.T.S. 123, recognizes the
right of the individual “to have his physical, mental and moral integrity respected” along with
the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
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issue in greater depth: the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).18
Although refugee law and human rights law were created to serve
different purposes under different global circumstances, many scholars,
activists, and practitioners have advocated using a human rights approach to
adjudicating asylum claims. For example, Hathaway has stated that
international human rights law is a means of regulating state actions and of
curtailing state sovereignty, arguably in order to protect individual citizens.19
While international refugee law seeks to protect individuals, it is also
concerned with protecting states’ sovereign borders and territories from
unwanted influxes of foreign nationals. At the crux of the difference is that
when human rights protections, which must come from an individual’s home
country, fail, then refugee law protection, which comes from a foreign state,
can be invoked as a last resort. To identify the precise point at which human
rights protections fail and refugee law protections may be invoked, the
instruments in both fields must be read together.
Indeed, some adjudicators already use both refugee and human rights law
in tandem, though many continue to rely exclusively on refugee law, hearing
claims in a vacuum of sorts. Refugee law, when considered without the
benefit of a human rights framework, runs into a series of problems. To
begin, refugee law is a product of post-World War II Western political
objectives and is therefore an outdated Euro-centric regime that was created
to address the main political problems of the time, namely the rampant
human rights violations of the Holocaust era.20 Applying refugee law in a
vacuum today would likely overlook and exclude most refugees from nonEuropean and developing countries.21 Second, the reality of contemporary
refugee law is that most persons who are forced to migrate and seek refugee
status must rely not on the state, but upon whatever emergency assistance or
resettlement opportunities are available to them through the aegis of various
unofficial and non-governmental agencies.22
The overwhelming challenges faced by vulnerable individuals who are
forced to migrate to find alternate protections, makes a strong argument for
re-conceiving refugee law as human rights protection.
This reconceptualization involves a showing of well-founded fear of persecution
18

Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
19 Hathaway, supra note 9.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22
Id.
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through a risk to basic human rights in addition to some differential impact
based on civil or political status.23 Additionally, there should be a “sphere of
autonomy for the victims of human rights violations so that any person
whose basic human dignity is at risk in her home state is empowered to leave
the abusive situation.”24
The CRPD can inform and influence domestic adjudication of asylum
claims in two ways: (1) as one of the many human rights instruments that
provide the framework in which refugee and asylum law should be situated
(i.e., the Hathaway approach to re-conceiving refugee and asylum law); or
(2) as an additional consideration in the so-called “defensive” asylum
programs of states where typically the CAT is the sole basis on which
adjudicators rely.
B. The CRPD as a Complement to the CAT in Defensive Asylum Claims or
Withholding of Removal
The CAT provides an alternative form of relief when a vulnerable party is
fleeing from his/her home country. In the United States, the affirmative
asylum program involves the submission of Form I-589 which is the
“Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal,” and is based on
the Refugee Convention and also in part on the United States’ obligations
under Article 3 of the CAT.25 The defensive asylum program (i.e., when an
individual is seeking asylum as a result of finding himself/herself in
deportation proceedings) is also based in part on the CAT.26 Under relevant
treaty provisions, the United States agrees not to “expel, return, or extradite
aliens to another country where they would be tortured.”27 Section 208.18 of
the Implementation of the CAT describes how a human rights treaty came to
be incorporated in the domestic asylum adjudication process and how it
should be interpreted.28
On December 13, 2006 when the CRPD was officially being adopted by
resolution of the UN General Assembly, the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee,
Ambassador Don MacKay, reiterated that
23

Id.
Id.
25 CAT, supra note 18, art. 3.
26 Id.
27 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT SHEET (Jan.
15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/AsylumWithholdingCATProtecti
ons.pdf.
28 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 19,
1999).
24
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existing human rights instruments have fallen far short in their
protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms
guaranteed to persons with disabilities . . . many of the
obligations under other instruments are set out in quite a broad
and generic way, which can leave grey areas for their practical
implementation in respect of particular groups.29
The CRPD, along with its Optional Protocol, was unique in its very
inception—it was the result of the fastest negotiations in human rights
history, and received almost immediate, widespread approval (ratified faster
than all treaties other than the CRC) from states.30 The CRPD entered into
force on May 3, 2008.31
The CRPD’s provisions, when read together and in keeping with the
drafters’ intent, form a powerful basis for human rights protections that
bolsters the provisions already in place through the CAT and other
instruments. Indeed the convention was ratified so quickly and widely in
part because its mandate was not to create “new” law, but rather to apply
existing rights to persons with disabilities, and provide context to the
determinations made on human rights issues concerning persons with
disabilities.32 However, Article 15 of the CRPD—the final formulation of
the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment—parallels the provision found in Article 7 of ICCPR,33 and
disability rights scholars are critical of its failure to contextualize the torture
prohibition with respect to persons with disabilities in any one specific
article.34 Instead, the prohibition set out in Article 15 of the CRPD is
29

Statements made on the Adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=155.
30 It was negotiated during eight sessions of an Ad Hoc Committee of the UN General
Assembly from 2002 to 2006 and received an unprecedented eighty-two signatures, as well as
forty-four signatures to the Optional Protocol, and one treaty ratification on its opening day.
See Lord, supra note 14; see also Mary Crock, Christine Ernst & Ron McCallum, Where
Disability and Displacement Intersect: Asylum Seekers and Refugees with Disabilities, 24
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 735 (2012).
31 CRPD, supra note 17.
32 Lord, supra note 14.
33 Compare CRPD, supra note 17, art. 15, with ICCPR, supra note 17, art 7.
34 Article 15 of the CRPD, supra note 17, provides that:
Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
1. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his or her free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. (includes
private and public institutions)

2014]

THE CRPD AND ITS IMPACT ON REFUGEE AND ASYLUM LAW

697

reinforced by an austere Article 17, which simply guarantees the physical
and mental integrity of persons with disabilities.35 Articles 15 and 17 must
therefore be read in conjunction with the remaining provisions of the CRPD,
in particular: the general principles in Article 3;36 along with Article 14,
(arguably serving the function of prohibiting forced or compulsory treatment
or living situations such as institutionalization), and Article 16, which
prohibits violence, abuse, and exploitation of persons with disabilities. Such
a reading will ensure a more accurate and nuanced process of interpretation
that is in line with the objectives of the treaty and with the rules of
international treaty interpretation.37
The Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaty Interpretation states in
Article 31 that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.”38 Furthermore, states’ obligations
under international law stem from the combination of international
instruments they have ratified. Treaties must be viewed as part of a whole
rather than as discrete, unrelated documents.39 Even when a state is not party
to a treaty, when the treaty has been as widely ratified as the CRPD, it should
2. States Parties shall take all effective legislative, administrative, judicial
or other measures to prevent persons with disabilities, on an equal basis
with others, from being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
35 Id. art. 17: Protecting the integrity of the person: Every person with disabilities has a
right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others.
36 Id. art. 3 : General principles:
The principles of the present Convention shall be:
(a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom
to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons;
(b) Non-discrimination;
(c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society;
(d) Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part
of human diversity and humanity;
(e) Equality of opportunity;
(f) Accessibility;
(g) Equality between men and women;
(h) Respect for the evolving capacities of children with disabilities and
respect for the right of children with disabilities to preserve their identities.
37 See Lord, supra note 14.
38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
39 U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006) (especially
1.3; 3, self-contained regimes).
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be valued by the international community as a whole and by non-parties at
least such that their actions are not in direct contravention of the treaty.40
The CRPD, when read as a whole,41 contains the specific and relevant
standards enshrined in the CAT but situates them in the context of
disability.42 In cases where torture is threatened or an individual risks cruel,
inhuman treatment upon return to his/her home country, the CAT is relied
upon with particularity, in addition to and sometimes in lieu of the national
legislation for determining refugee status or withholding of removal.
Similarly, in cases involving persons with disabilities the CRPD should carry
special weight in asylum adjudication and in the withholding of removal.
Like the CAT, it should have a specific role in domestic legislation which
incorporates the Refugee Convention and Optional Protocol.
When faced with the inability to persuade adjudicators of the linkage
between the harm and one of the five nexus grounds prescribed by refugee
law, applicants with disability often turn to the CAT as a fall back option and
attempt to show that the harm they face is so severe that it does not matter
whether it is related to one of the five grounds. The CRPD should alleviate
the burden of proof that applicants with disability have had to shoulder in the
past, by relying on the CAT as the only human rights treaty available to
them. For example, in the United States, the Third Circuit decided a case in
favor of an HIV positive Haitian amputee whose claim was brought on the
basis of his unique susceptibility to torture and cruel and inhuman treatment
upon return to Haiti.43 Although adjudicators had rejected previous cases
involving Haitian nationals without disabilities,44 on the grounds that torture
required particular intent on the part of the Haitian state and its authorities,
the Court of Appeals found that the applicant had satisfied his burden of
proof by submitting reports of his specific condition, and general reports of
the prevalent conditions in Haiti, in reliance on the CAT.45 The anti-torture
provisions of the CRPD when read holistically with the remainder of the
treaty should permit a disabled applicant to make a stronger case in reliance
on his/her disability rather than on the general terms of article 3 of the CAT
which requires a high threshold to be met to show that an act constitutes
40

Baker v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
See supra text accompanying notes 35–37 (discussing arts. 15 and 17 of the CRPD).
42 Lord, supra note 14.
43 Lavira v. Attn’y Gen., 478 F.3d 158, 170–71 (3d Cir. 2007), overruled in part by Pierre
v. Attn’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180 (2008) (finding that willful blindness of a disability can be used
to establish knowledge by a government official of heightened risk of torture but it does not
satisfy the specific intent requirement in the CAT).
44 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 129 (3d Cir. 2005).
45
Lavira, 478 F.3d at 170.
41
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torture per se. The critical element in Lavira was the combination of factors
he could demonstrate, not only that the applicant was an amputee but rather
the discriminatory behavior of Haitian authorities against those who were
HIV positive and that he had been a longtime political supporter of Haiti’s
exiled political leader. Without the combination of factors and most
importantly, the known discrimination against HIV positive individuals,
Lavira’s case may have been decided differently. As courts become
increasingly hesitant to grant asylum to such individuals, the CRPD will be a
useful tool.
C. Situating Refugee and Asylum Law in a Human Rights Framework that
Includes the CRPD
When the CAT was drafted in 1984, the UN appointed a Special
Rapporteur to monitor compliance by states. The plight of persons with
disabilities was the subject of a recent report by the Special Rapporteur who
“haile[d] the entry into force of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, which reaffirm[ed] the absolute prohibition of torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and which offers
authoritative guidance in the interpretation of the rights and fundamental
freedoms of persons with disabilities,”46 because despite the existing human
rights instruments, disability-specific instruments, such as the CRPD,
provide necessary additional guidance on matters pertaining to the physical
and mental integrity of persons with disabilities.47 When the CRPD was
created, it consolidated and replaced a host of existing bodies and programs
which had proven inadequate, over time, in addressing the needs of persons
with disabilities.48
Even if the CRPD does not support a separate basis for seeking asylum or
withholding from removal similar to the CAT, like the CRC and CEDAW,
which are commonly invoked in cases of especially vulnerable classes of
refugees, the CRPD should be considered by adjudicators when hearing
claims brought by persons with disabilities. For example, in Baker v.
46 Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, Interim Report on Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/64/215 (Aug. 3,
2009), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/437/92/PDF/N0943
792.pdf?OpenElement.
47 Lord, supra note 14.
48 The erstwhile World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons (adopted 1982)
and the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities
(adopted 1993) both failed to explicitly address the fundamental right of persons with
disabilities to live free of torture. Lord, supra note 14.
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Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada consulted the CRC even though the
treaty had not yet been incorporated into Canadian law and held that
although the CRC had no direct effect domestically, the “values reflected in
international human rights law may help inform the contextual approach to
statutory interpretation and judicial review.”49
The question of whether and how the CRPD should be read in
conjunction with the pre-existing Refugee Convention (i.e., how it applies to
refugees), is addressed implicitly by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN’s specialized agency dealing with refugee
populations. After the creation of the CRPD, in 2010, the Executive
Committee (Committee) of the UNHCR began drafting a Conclusion on
refugees with disabilities, and examined, among other things, the
applicability of the CRPD to refugees, both directly and indirectly.50 First,
the Committee contrasted that in theory, states obligations under the CRPD
were owed only to nationals, whereas the obligations under the Refugee
Convention were owed to foreign nationals.51 On a practical level, the
Committee was concerned that “host States, which are often developing
countries, have limited resources and face various challenges in providing
such services and facilities” and therefore, reaffirmed the role of the
international community in burden-sharing.52 In spite of these concerns, the
Committee’s conclusions imply that the CRPD does indeed apply to refugees
(although not expressly stated).53 The Committee, by virtue of the language
used in its conclusion, implicitly recognizes the relevance of the CRPD to
refugees and recalls “the recognition by the [CRPD] of the inherent dignity
and equality of persons with disabilities,” and recommends ensuring “that
refugee status determination and all other relevant procedures are accessible
and designed to enable persons with disabilities to fully and fairly represent
their claims with the necessary support.”54 The Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities has been in agreement with the UNHCR
Conclusions.55 Relying on the Vienna Convention and well-established
49

Baker v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, ¶ 69.
Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 4.
51 Id.
52 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusion on refugees with disabilities and
other persons with disabilities protected and assisted by UNHCR, No. 110 (LXI) - 2010 (Oct.
12, 2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4cbeb1a99.html.
53 Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 4.
54 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 52.
55 U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Report of the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A/66/55 (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/docid/4eef033a2.html.
50
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principles of treaty interpretation further bolsters the UNHCR’s Conclusions
that the CRPD does apply to refugees and can be read as a complement to the
Refugee Convention.56
The subsequent sections will detail how the CRPD reduces some of the
definitional barriers which persons with disabilities have historically faced
when seeking asylum under international refugee law.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING
“DISABILITY” UNDER THE CRPD
A. The Evolution of Modern Disability Studies
Disability has evolved, over time, as a general concept, and
correspondingly as a field of legal study. Disability Studies scholars have
articulated several models of understanding and defining disability: the
medical model or welfare-model, the social model, and the human rights
model will be considered below.
This understanding has come about through an evolutionary process,
which found its beginnings in a medically-based approach which continues
to be the dominant approach in many countries.57 Arlene Kanter summarizes
Modern Disability Studies as
the examination of disability as a social, cultural, and political
phenomenon, which counters the notion of disability as an
inherent, immutable trait located in the person, . . . By defining
disability as a social category rather than an individual
characteristic, disability is no longer the exclusive domain of
medicine, rehabilitation, special education, physical or
occupational therapy, and other professions oriented toward the
cure, prevention, or treatment of a disease, injury, or physical
or mental impairment.58

56 VCLT, supra note 38, art. 26 (“Absent a contrary intention, a treaty is binding upon each
State Party in respect of its entire territory.”); accord Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note
30, at 5.
57 In the U.S., there is ongoing debate as to whether the American with Disabilities Act
(ADA), the primary legislation dealing with disability, should continue with the social and
civil rights approach or revert to the medical and welfare approach. See Mark C. Weber,
Disability Rights, Welfare Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2483 (2011).
58 Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do with it or An
Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 408 (2011).
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In its 2011 World Report on Disability, the World Health Organization
(WHO) observes: “The disability experience resulting from the interaction of
health conditions, personal factors, and environmental factors varies greatly.
Persons with disabilities are diverse and heterogeneous, while stereotypical
views of disability emphasize wheelchair users and a few other ‘classic’
groups such as blind people and deaf people.”59
B. Different Approaches to Understanding Disability
The medical model of disability is perhaps the oldest permutation,
forming the basis for many charitable and welfare-style programs for persons
with disability. This model is paternalistic, and attaches a heavy burden of
stigma to the individual who is viewed through its lens. Simply put, this
model uses disability and impairment interchangeably and defines a person
exclusively by her impairment.60 The medical model has prompted societies
to “treat” or use medical intervention to help persons with disabilities but it
also influences societies to exclude such individuals through institutional
methods that reinforce the marginalization of such persons even while
helping them.61
The modern disability rights movement, which has given rise to the social
and civil rights approaches to understanding disability, balances “that
physical or mental conditions do not themselves disable, but instead that
environmental and attitudinal barriers keep people with physical and mental
conditions from full and equal participation in daily life.”62 The social model
emphasizes the difference between an “impairment,” which is a specific
physical or mental condition or a sensory (vision, hearing) deprivation, and
“disability,” which is the consequence of society reacting to the
impairment.63 However, even within the social approach to disability, there
59

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON DISABILITY 7 (2011), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240685215_eng.pdf?ua=1.
60 Kanter, supra note 58, at 419.
61 Id.
62 Weber advocates moving from the social model civil rights model in order
to promote the realization that reforms to eliminate the attitudinal and
physical barriers society imposes are a matter of fundamental social justice
and legal policy. Viewed in this way, the model may have much to say about
which welfare reforms to advance. The civil rights approach—identifying
societal sources of disadvantage and looking for legal and policy solutions to
them—further enriches the discussion by placing law reform front and center.
While this may be viable in a domestic context, in the international context the social model is
more broadly acceptable. Weber, supra note 57.
63
Kanter, supra note 58, at 419.
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are variations. On one hand, everyone is considered to have impairments
and the negative treatment we face based on those impairments is considered
disabling. On the other hand, only systemic disadvantages caused by an
impairment is disabling.64 Ultimately, under the social model it is the
negative treatment of someone with an impairment that constitutes a
disability.
Both the medical and social approaches to disability deal with a problem
versus solution paradigm. In the former, the problem is the disability and the
solution is medical treatment. In the latter, the problem is society’s negative
treatment of an impairment and the solution is enduring changes in society’s
behavior. Critical of the social approach’s reliance on random social agents
to create change, Mark Weber argues that
To achieve equality, the person with the disability must be the
agent rather than the passive recipient of social interventions,
the subject of the sentence rather than the object. This is what
the social model is about, and that realization strongly supports
a full-fledged civil rights approach to disability and disability
policy.65

The civil rights model that he proposes, however, also construes disability
under the problem versus solution paradigm; the problem is identifying
societal sources of disadvantage and the answer is “looking for legal and
policy solutions to them.”66 The main difference is that the civil rights
model “promote[s] the realization that reforms to eliminate the attitudinal
and physical barriers society imposes are a matter of fundamental social
justice and legal policy,” and is therefore more likely to lead to law
reform where persons with disability play a central role rather than
depend on the vagaries of abstract social agents to bring about change.67
The definition of disability adopted by the United Nations68 and the
international human rights community was developed by the World Health
Organization (WHO) in 1980 and also distinguishes between impairment and

64 Kevin Barry, Gray Matters: Autism, Impairment and the End of Binaries, 49 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 161, 196–97 (2012) (discussing the universal and minority group variations within the
social approach to disability).
65 Weber, supra note 57, at 109.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68
G.A. Res. 48/96, 91 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/96 (Dec. 20, 1993).
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disability; the former is an anatomical loss, and the latter is a restriction
resulting from the impairment.69
Realizing that the medical, social, and civil rights approaches to disability
regard impairments as a problem, and something to be rid of, and situate the
issue in terms of problem and solution, critics created yet another
formulation of disability studies: the human rights approach. Professor
Michael Stein coined the term “disability human rights” and describes the
formulation of this paradigm as one that “combines components of the social
model of disability, the human right to development, and philosopher Martha
Nussbaum’s version of the ‘capabilities approach,’ but filters these
frameworks through a disability rights perspective to preserve that which
provides for individual flourishing and modify that which does not.”70
Rather than focus on the capabilities of persons with disabilities, or the lack
thereof, disability human rights focuses on the talents of persons with
disabilities and thereby places greater emphasis on dignity and autonomy.71
For example, an individual with autism may be deemed incapable of
functioning “normally” and therefore cannot contribute sufficiently to
society. On the other hand, she may have a keen ear for music and be a
violin virtuoso allowing her to contribute to society through creativity and
musical skill. Therefore the former classification potentially undermines her
human dignity and autonomy. In contrast, the human rights paradigm avoids
the marginalization and exclusion which the social approach could allow and
argues that the rights enjoyed by an individual “derives from common
humanity, rather than actual or potential contribution to the society in
reciprocity for benefits, or even from shared vulnerabilities as members of
the community.”72 The human rights paradigm also treats so-called first
generation rights (or negative rights such as the right to be free of
discrimination and torture) as equally important to second-generation or
positive rights (such as the right to education and to employment).
Paradoxically, while using the human rights approach may prove
effective in establishing a well-founded fear of persecution (discussed
previously), it is the social approach to disability which is likely to be
particularly effective in showing membership in a particular social group.
69 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF IMPAIRMENTS,
DISABILITIES, AND HANDICAPS: A MANUAL OF CLASSIFICATION RELATING TO THE
CONSEQUENCES OF DISEASE 47, 143 (1980), available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/106
65/41003/1/9241541261_eng.pdf?ua=1.
70 Michael Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 76–77 (2007).
71 Id.
72
Weber, supra note 57, at 146 (citations omitted).
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The CRPD may support both approaches to disability but it remains to be
seen whether and how adjudicators will use both in hearing asylum claims.
C. Using the Various Approaches to Disability Studies in Conjunction with
the CRPD
The CRPD does not contain a precise or explicit definition of disability,
which allows for the term to be interpreted using a social and human rights
approach. This was a deliberate choice; given the evolutionary nature of
disability studies and the wide divergences in understanding the concept of
“disability,” it was decided that the CRPD should not include a definition of
disability since any definition would necessarily include some people and not
others.73 Further, including a definition of disability in the CRPD could
undermine its commitment to interpreting disability using the social model,
thereby risking a shift in focus from society’s unequal treatment to the
individual.74
Although some perceive and celebrate the lack of a definition of
“disability,” others find that the CRPD, does define disability, albeit in
imprecise terms: “ ‘as an evolving concept’ that ‘results from the interaction
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers
that hinders, their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis
with others’ and not as an inherent characteristic.”75 The absence of a
specific definition for “disability” allows applicants to demonstrate their
disability in diverse ways. For example, in states where the medical
definition is predominant, asylum applications may be dismissed on the
grounds that medical treatment and access to healthcare are not permissible
grounds for seeking refugee status. Using the CRPD would allow the same
applicant to recast her claim under a human rights model of disability to
show that the conduct she is fleeing does amount to serious harm and to
persecution. Using the CRPD and a social model of disability where the
element of societal discrimination or mistreatment is implicit would allow
the applicant to satisfy the requirement that the persecution she faces is

73

See generally Kanter, supra note 58, at n.121 (citing UN General Assembly, Ad Hoc
Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Aug. 17, 2005, A/60/266,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43f30fa60.html).
74 Id.
75 Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, Enabling Refugee and IDP Law and Policy:
Implications of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 28 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 401, 423 (2011).
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particularized to her, as demonstrated below in the discussion of membership
within a particular social group.
III. SHOWING WELL-FOUNDED FEAR USING THE CRPD
The Refugee Convention’s definition of a refugee, contained in Article 1
of the treaty, forms the basis of the claim adjudication process in most states,
and often involves a complicated set of administrative procedures, including
interviews, providing evidence and appealing a denial.76 Showing that a fear
is (1) “well-founded” and a result of (2) “persecution” as required by Article
1, are two of the main challenges which applicants with disabilities most
commonly encounter.77 In showing that a fear is well-founded, disabled
applicants (particularly with mental disabilities) must overcome unique
challenges. To be “well” founded, a fear must stem from objectively
verifiable grounds.78 Also, the “fear” must be subjectively felt by the
applicant herself, which can pose unique difficulty in cases involving mental
impairments. In a recent piece, Australian scholars Mary Crock, Ron
McCallum, and Christine Ernst suggest two interesting strategies that aid in
establishing a well-founded fear.79 Their models combined with the human
rights approach to disability as suggested by the CRPD, facilitate the
showing of persecution under the Refugee Convention. Namely such a
combination facilitates over coming two main roadblocks: (1) having to
counter that certain harmful conduct resembling discrimination does not rise
to the level of seriousness to constitute persecution and (2) showing that
certain harm is particularized, not simply the result of a widespread lack of
resources in the applicant’s home state.80 Below is a brief recounting of
Crock, McCallum, and Ernst’s suggestions for showing “well-founded fear,”
followed by a discussion of the human rights approach to showing
“persecution” arising by reason of one of the five specified grounds.

76 Refugee Convention, supra note 10, art. 1; see Elisa Mason, Guide to International
Refugee Law Resources on the Web (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.llrx.com/feature
s/refugee.htm/.
77 Mary Crock, Ron McCallum & Christine Ernst, Where Disability and Displacement
Intersect: Asylum Seekers with Disabilities 4, 12 (Discussion paper prepared for the
Vulnerable Persons Working Group International Association of Refugee Law Judges World
Conference Sept. 2011), available at http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/BLED_conf
erence/papers/Disability_and_Displacement-backgrou nd_paper.pdf.
78 See infra Part III.A.
79 See infra Part III.A.
80
See infra Part III.A.
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A. Showing Well-Founded Fear
Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention requires that a refugee’s fear
of persecution be “well-founded.”81 Well-founded fear imports both a
subjective element and an objective one. To satisfy the subjective element,
asylum seekers must actually fear persecution. To satisfy the objective
element, asylum seekers’ fear must be deemed reasonable to the average
person.82 For example, in the U.S., an asylum applicant must show that her
“well-founded fear of persecution . . . is (subjectively) genuine and that it is
reasonable in light of the (objective) credible evidence.”83 Thus, an applicant
must establish that her fear is “both subjectively real and objectively
reasonable.”84 Both of these elements may pose problems for asylum seekers
with disabilities, including those whose claims are not substantively related
to their disability.85
To show objective fear, it is sufficient to show that a person’s reasons for
perceiving that fear are objective.86 Borrowing from the U.S. tort law
principle of an egg-shell skull or increased susceptibility, Crock, McCallum,
and Ernst suggest that “when a mental or physical condition heightens the
perception or severity of a situation which the average person would not
objectively find fearful, that fear could still qualify as ‘objective’ if the
mental or physical condition underlying its perception is objectively
verified.”87 In the disability context, “while some persons with disabilities
may be incapable of comprehending fear, others may hold fears that are
aggravated by their mental or intellectual disability . . . In other words, they
may intensely fear situations that would not necessarily induce such fear in
persons without any disability,” such as social phobias, personality disorders,
post-traumatic stress.88 While the scholars admit that their approach has not
yet been seen in asylum adjudication, key reference tools and guides used
widely by the international legal community support accepting as objective a
fear that is so perceived due to an individual’s disability, and suggest
81

Refugee Convention, supra note 10, art. 1(A)(2).
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶¶ 38–41 (Jan. 1992) available at http://www.unhcr.
org/refwor ld/docid/3ae6b3314.html [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
83 Tzankov v. INS, 107 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
84 Bradvica v. INS, 128 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1997).
85 Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 12–13.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88
Id.
82
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adapting the standard for certain vulnerable populations.89 Thus, even an
exaggerated fear could be considered objective, provided it is reasonable for
a mentally or physically disabled person to hold such fears.90
In addition to the creative use of U.S. tort law to establish certain atypical
fears as objective, Crock, McCallum, and Ernst also suggest borrowing from
children’s rights rhetoric where children are considered uniquely
“vulnerable” and therefore susceptible to fears that adults are not.91 The
corollary to the CRPD in the children’s rights context, the CRC, is used by
adjudicators in adjudicating claims brought by child asylum applicants. For
example, the principle of “best interest of the child” which is a key element
of the CRC (the only treaty more widely and rapidly ratified than the CRPD)
is used to lower the burden of proof on a child to demonstrate fear in asylum
cases. It can be argued that the CRPD should similarly be used by
adjudicators in cases involving persons with disabilities.
In Sweden, the domestic legislation for asylum adjudication (Swedish
Aliens Act) states “that the best interests of the child can allow residence
permits to be granted on humanitarian grounds for less compelling reasons
when children are affected than otherwise.”92 Thus, children may be granted
refugee status even when they cannot demonstrate the level of harm normally
required to be shown.93 Similarly, in Canadian jurisprudence, national
guidelines lower the burden of proof which child applicants face in showing
both objective and subjective elements of well-founded fear, and “recognize
that children may manifest their fears differently from adults, and harmful
actions that may reach the level of harassment or discrimination when
applied to adults may constitute persecution in relation to a child.”94
Crock, McCallum, and Ernst recognize that the second prong of a
showing of well-founded fear, the need to demonstrate subjective fear, can
prove particularly problematic for persons with mental or intellectual
disabilities who, despite being in situations of danger, do not subjectively
89

Id. The UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 82, is a resource for government officials,
judges, and practitioners applying the refugee definition, and provides critical assistance in
resolving variations in interpretation.
90 Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 12–13.
91 Jane McAdam, Seeking Asylum under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: A case
for Complementary Protection, 14 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 260 (2006) (citations omitted).
92 Id. (citing J. Schiratzki, The Best Interests of the Child in the Swedish Aliens Act, 14
NT
I ’L J. LAW, POL’Y & FAM. 206, 218 (2000) (citing [Prop.] 1996/97: 25 at 249 [government
bill] (Swed.))).
93 Id. (citing Aliens Appeals Board 970130, 970314).
94 Id. (citing Separated Children in Europe Programme, 2004, ¶ 12.2.1; Malchikov v
Canada, I.M.M.-1673-95 (18 January 1996)).
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experience fear.95 Therefore they suggest, once again, that the field of
children’s rights can provide some useful examples and guidance for the
disability context.96 Even when the conditions or circumstances are
objectively dangerous, some persons with disabilities lack the psychological
or cognitive ability to fear situations.97 In theory, if the “subjective fear”
requirement is applied too strictly, “all persons who are incompetent will, by
reason of that incompetence, be unable to qualify as Refugee Convention
refugees.”98 Sweden provides a useful example: while there are no instances
where a child’s fears alone (without corroborating evidence), gives rise to a
right for refugee status, “children’s mental reactions to excesses were
deemed to strengthen the credibility and weight of the reasons pleaded by the
parent as grounds for asylum.”99
The High Court of Australia has maintained that children lack the
“maturity” necessary to perceive subjective fear and has formulated a
substitute holding that “it is sufficient for their parents to hold a subjective
fear on their behalf.”100 Although there is criticism of using “maturity” as a
standard101 in the case of children, Crock, McCallum, and Ernst argue that it
is natural to “extend this logic to psychologically or cognitively impaired
adults.”102 It follows that as in the case of child-asylum seekers, it is
permissible to accept the subjective fear of a guardian or family member (or
simply the available evidence)103 if a disabled person lacks capacity to hold

95

Id.
Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 12.
97 MARY CROCK & LAURIE BERG, IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION 383
(2011).
98 Canada (Minister of Citizenship v. Immigration) v. Patel, [2008] FC 747, ¶ 28.
99 McAdam, supra note 91, at 260 (citations omitted).
100 Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 12 (citing Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293, 297).
101 See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 357 (1996); Jacqueline
Bhabha, Minors or Aliens? Inconsistent State Intervention and Separated Child AsylumSeekers, 3 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 283, 297–98 (2001). Although Goodwin-Gill agrees that
channeling child asylum-seekers into refugee status determination processes “will often
merely interpose another obstacle between the child and a solution,” he approaches the
problem from the perspective of the child’s best interests. GOODWIN-GILL, supra, at 358. He
argues that an emphasis on maturity is misguided because there is no necessary correlation
between any particular level of maturity and the existence of a well-founded fear; maturity is
irrelevant to the question of whether the child may be persecuted; and maturity does not affect
a child’s capability of feeling fear (e.g., Yusuf v M.E.I., [1992] 1 F.C. 629), but “may affect
merely their capacity to understand the events or conditions which are the basis of that fear.”
GOODWIN-GILL, supra, at 357.
102 Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 12.
103
Canada v. Patel, [2008] F.C. 747, ¶¶ 29, 38; see also Yusuf v. Canada, [1992] 1 F.C. 629, 632.
96
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subjective fear of persecution.104 The determination of fear may be made
based entirely on the basis of a family member or third party’s fear on behalf
of an applicant even when they are unable to accompany the applicant,
whose own subjective fear cannot be established using the conventional
framework.105
IV. THE CRPD’S HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DISABILITY FACILITATES
SHOWING PERSECUTION
A. Persecution as Generally Understood in Refugee Law
Once an applicant establishes that her fear is well-founded, she must
show that what she fears is conduct that may be characterized as
“persecution,” under the Refugee Convention. Persecution is the
combination of serious harm (arguably also the violation of certain human
rights) and the failure of a state to protect from such serious harms and
violations of human rights from occurring again. Using the medical
definition of persecution, discussed infra Part IV.B.1, adjudicators would
likely characterize a disabled person’s asylum claim as one based purely on
socio-economic factors, e.g., access to superior health care and medical
treatment, and would deny the claim.
There is no clear, definitive meaning for persecution in refugee law.106
Reading the Refugee Convention in light of the context, object and purpose,
as per traditional treaty interpretation guidelines,107 gives rise to several
meanings. In an era characterized by the dual themes of equality and nondiscrimination, persecution is often viewed in terms of a spectrum.108 For
example, persecution is an “especially severe form of discrimination, but less
serious than genocide. . . .”109 In the absence of a universal definition for
“persecution,” the UNHCR Handbook suggests that a definition may be
inferred from Article 33 of the Refugee Convention: “A threat to life or
freedom on account of” one of the five protected grounds is “always
persecution.”110 In the view of some conservative theorists, only this narrow

104

Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 12.
Id. at 13.
106 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 82, ¶ 51.
107 VCLT, supra note 38, art. 31.
108 Hathaway, supra note 9.
109 Daniel J. Steinbock, The Evolving Refugee Definition: Issues of Interpretation, in
REFUGEE RIGHTS & REALITIES 22–25 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
110
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 82, art. 33.
105
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subset of human rights violations constitutes persecution.111 A less literal
reading of Article 33 suggests, however, that other serious violations of
human rights would also constitute persecution.112
Taking a human rights approach to defining persecution, it may be
viewed as violations of fundamental rights or as the cumulative violation of
several rights, and by reference to the rights and freedoms outlined in various
human rights instruments. Courts are often inconsistent in measuring and
assessing persecution. Indeed they have several paradigms to choose from.
One put forth by Hathaway is “the sustained or systemic violation of basic
human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.”113 Guy
Goodwin-Gill’s notion of persecution emphasizes the dynamic nature of
persecution, stressing the need for its definition to respond to current
developments in human rights.114 Jean-Yves Carlier proposes analyzing
persecution in terms of degrees of breach—persecution is assumed to be
present as soon as the treatment suffered disproportionately violates a basic
human right.115 Another approach is to use human rights instruments,
considering the seriousness of breach, which implicates state responsibility
or failure of state protection.116 Yet another paradigm involves sorting the
myriad rights enshrined in the ICCPR, ICSCER and UDHR into a hierarchy
(e.g., the right the life is more important than the right to vote).117
While some courts, primarily in New Zealand, Canada and the UK use
human rights law and its instruments as a resource, the human rights
framework is largely absent in the U.S. assessment of serious harm and
persecution. However, in recent U.S. jurisprudence, it has received some
attention in the context of gender-based asylum claims.118

111

JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 107 (1991) (citations omitted).
Kate Jastram & Shelly Cavalieri, Human Rights in Refugee Tribunals, 24 REFUGEE SURV.
Q., no. 2, 2005 at 9.
113 HATHAWAY supra note 111, at 104–05.
114 GOODWIN-GILL supra note 101, at 67.
115 Jean-Yves Carlier, The Geneva Refugee Definition and the Theory of the Three Scales, in
REFUGEE RIGHTS & REALITIES, at 37, 40–45.
116 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REFUGEE LAW JUDGES, A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE
REPORT (1998); Gashi & Nikshiqi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1997]
INLR 96.
117 HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 110–11.
118
Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30 (citing In re R-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005)).
112
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1. Adjudication of Asylum Cases on the Basis of Gender: A Potential
Model for Adjudicating Claims on the Basis of Disability
Following the issuance of specific gender-related Guidelines by the
UNHCR,119 Canada, the U.S., Australia, and the UK120 have issued their own
national guidelines for decision makers in gender-based asylum cases.121
The UNHCR has similarly issued guidelines for asylum claims based on
disability, and in time it is likely that individual states will follow suit.
Therefore it is useful to consider existing guidelines for the gender-based
claims to understand the possibilities which may exist in the disability
context. The Canadian Guidelines, for gender-based claims, recognize the
benefit of a common international standard and prescribe the use of human
rights instruments to consider whether a harm both experienced and feared is
“a serious violation of a fundamental human right” before calling it
persecution.122 The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeal Authority refused
to apply the country of asylum’s domestic human rights standards, reasoning
that since refugee law is an international law system, its proper adjudication
in light of national politics and biases requires international definitions. The
U.S. Guidelines are less dependent on international human rights standards
and afford more discretion to decision makers in assessing whether certain
instances of harm rise to the level of persecution. For instance, the
guidelines provide examples of the types of harm that women might suffer,
including sexual abuse, rape, forced marriage, slavery, domestic violence and
forced abortion, but do not label such harm as persecution.123

119

Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection
of Refugee Women, 54, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines].
120 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 82, ¶ 51 (“[S]erious violations of human
rights . . . would constitute persecution.”).
121 See generally IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, GUIDELINE 4: WOMEN
REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION: UPDATE (Nov. 25, 1996);
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, GUIDELINES ON WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS
FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (March, 1993); Memorandum from Phyllis Coven,
Office of International Affairs, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, to All INS
Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators, Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating
Asylum Claims for Women (May 26, 1995); AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN VISA APPLICANTS: GUIDELINES ON
GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS (July 1996). See also IMMIGRATION APPELLATE
AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, ASYLUM GENDER GUIDELINES (Nov. 2000).
122 THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, GENDER AND REFUGEE STATUS 173 (2000).
123
Lord, supra note 14, at 77 n.276.
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B. Persecution in Disability Cases
First is a discussion of the serious harm that constitutes persecution,
followed by an analysis of failure of state protection.
1. Showing Serious Harm in a Disability Case
Applicants with disabilities face difficulty in showing that harm they face
is serious enough to constitute persecution. Commonly, conduct is found to
amount to discrimination but not to serious harm. Cases where harm is not
so obvious as to immediately invoke images of torture or clearly comprise
involuntary institutionalization are often dismissed as not serious enough to
rise to the level of persecution. In the absence of a clear guiding framework,
decisions involving disability-based asylum claims are often inconsistent.
Using a human rights approach to understanding disability would ensure that
adjudicators were consistent in decision making, in compliance with the
CRPD and adapting to the evolutionary nature of disability studies. A
human rights approach also offers some clarity in understanding the
relationship between discrimination and disability.
A case which illustrates adjudicators’ medically-themed understanding of
disability involves a Mongolian applicant in Australia. Although the
specifics of his disability are undisclosed, the applicant provided evidence
for his claim in the form of letters from medical organizations in Mongolia
indicating that his treatment would likely be disrupted upon his return. This
was combined with evidence that the applicant’s condition was indeed
serious and that he was undergoing treatment in Australia. Adjudicators
noted that in the absence of a link between a protected grounds for refugee
status, the disability alone would not merit consideration and found that
while persons with disability face considerable hardship in Mongolia such
hardship does not amount to persecution.124 The resolution of this case
shows how applicants with disabilities are denied relief when their case is
construed under the medical model of disability where the disability is a
medical condition and the relief sought is treatment.
The human rights approach to disability complements the previously
discussed non-hierarchical human rights paradigms for perceiving
persecution because, unlike other approaches to understanding disability, it
does not emphasize civil and political rights and overlook socio-economic

124

RRT Case No. 1002307, [2010] RRTA 532 (July 5, 2010), available at http://www.unhc
r.org/refworld/docid/4c84c7a72.html.
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rights and is therefore the truest reflection of the CRPD. This approach,
called “disability human rights” by Professor Michael Stein, allows the
CRPD to be analyzed as a series of positive (typically socio-economic) rights
such as education, employment, safety, and housing, as well as negative
(typically civil and political) rights such as freedom from torture and
discrimination, further promotes the human rights approach to disability and
the facilitation of showing persecution.125 Professor Michael Perlin
proclaims the CRPD “furthers the human rights approach to disability and
recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most aspects of
life.”126 Using the human rights approach states cannot get away with
ensuring only civil and political rights which are usually cost-free. Instead,
they will be more likely to ensure that budgetary allocations are made for
providing socio-economic rights as well. Simultaneously, the socioeconomic rights of persons with disabilities, which are overlooked in favor
of civil and political rights will be respected, and harmful conduct will be
identified before it rises to the level of life-threatening seriousness or even
death.
The utility of the human rights approach to disability is evident in cases
where involuntary institutionalization of a person with disability or other
instances of forced confinement and torture are absent, and yet where
circumstances create severe constraints on mobility and positive rights.
Taking the same example of the Mongolian applicant, had he demonstrated
that his impairment rendered him unable to move freely, to secure
employment, adequate housing, education and healthcare, his claim may
have been adjudicated favorably using the human rights approach to
disability.
In the United Kingdom, adjudicators denied the asylum claim of a deaf
Liberian national who argued that returning him to Liberia would violate
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (which guarantees
the right to respect for private life)127 and that there was a lack of assistance
125

Weber, supra note 57, at 145 (citations omitted).
Michael L. Perlin, “A Change is Gonna Come”: The Implications of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of
Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 490 (2009).
127 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 8 provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
126
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for deaf people in Liberia.128 The right to private life was interpreted as a
“protection against sufficiently adverse effects on a person’s physical and
moral integrity” and as a “right to establish and develop relationships with
other human beings in the outside world.”129 In Bensaid v. United Kingdom
the court held that its own precedent does not exclude from consideration
health cases where “treatment which does not reach the severity of Article 3
treatment may nonetheless breach Article 8 in its private life aspect where
there are sufficiently adverse effects on physical and moral integrity.”130
In the same case of a Liberian national, discussed above, although the
court admits that “Article 8 might be engaged in cases where a claimant
suffered from serious mental illness,” the court denied asylum based on the
lack of “exceptionality” of the applicant’s claims, stating that Article 8
protections are “directed to the protection of fundamental rights, not the
conferment of individual advantages or benefits.”131 Though the term
“exceptionality” may suggest that the court’s decision was based on the
generalized nature of the harm (i.e., it was not unique to the applicant), their
reasoning also suggests that the harm experienced by the applicant did not
rise to the level of seriousness that would merit consideration. Additionally,
the adjudicators decided that assistance could possibly be available to deaf
citizens in Liberia simply because the Liberia National Association for the
Deaf “maintained a current registration as a member of the World Federation
of the Deaf,” although it was effectively no longer active in the community.
Similarly, it was satisfied that a missionary had helped deaf people in
Monrovia in the past, though it was aware that “funding for his work was
limited and it was not clear whether he was still able to serve deaf people at
the date of the decision. . . .”132
In another case involving a minor child who was deaf and suffered from a
specific language impairment, the court found that his removal would result
in an Article 8 violation, on the basis that his “special educational needs are
complex and pronounced and require a very particular form of intensive and
structured teaching input,” and that while he was making progress in the UK,
economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
128 In the petition of FNG, [2008] CSOH 22, (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refw
orld/docid/47fa09572.html.
129 Id. (citations omitted).
130 33 EHRR 205 (paras. 46–47).
131 In the petition of FNG, [2008] CSOH 22, para. 19 (2008) (Scot.), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fa09572.html (citations omitted).
132
Id.
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if he were “required to restart his education in Germany there would be a
major discontinuity in the support available to him with a significant risk that
in the long-term [he] would not be able to communicate functionally in any
spoken language.”133
While discrimination alone is unlikely to rise to the level of harm
necessary for a finding of persecution, in disability cases, discriminatory
behavior can result in severe and even complete restrictions of freedom of
movement. In cases not involving disability, such severe limits on freedom
of movement and physical mobility would likely be serious human rights
violations.
2. Cumulative Discrimination
Although harassment or discrimination alone have not been found to rise
to the level of persecution,134 “the cumulative effects of multiple incidents of
discrimination, harassment and violence may constitute persecution, as
would incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation [accompanied] by
physical punishment, infliction of harm or significant deprivation of
liberty.”135 There are also certain circumstances where discrimination may
constitute persecution, “if the measures of discrimination lead to
consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person
involved.”136 For example, restrictions on a person’s livelihood or
educational opportunities due to one’s religion may constitute a form of
persecution.137 In recent cases involving gay and lesbian asylum applicants,
discrimination against them in the form of police brutality, police sanctioned
“death squads,” and mandatory psychiatric treatment including forced drug
“therapies” was sufficient to constitute persecution under the asylum
provision of the INA.138 Even in instances where physical harm is not one of
the consequences of discrimination, cumulative persecution can amount to
133 R (Jegatheeswaran) v Sec’y of State for the Home Department, [2005] EWHC
1131(Admin) ¶ 23.
134 Arlene S. Kanter & Kristin Dadey, The Right to Asylum for People with Disabilities, 73
TEMP. L. REV. 1117 (citing Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995)).
135 Id. (citations omitted).
136 Id. (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 82).
137 Id. (citations omitted). For additional definitions of persecution, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, The Meaning of “Persecution” in United States Asylum Law, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE
L. 5, 21–22 (1991) and GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 101, at 351.
138 Kanter & Dadey, supra note 134, at 149 (citing Keith Donoghue, After Reno Ruling,
More Gays Win Asylum, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at 2); see also Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118
F.3d 641, 648–49 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that beating, forced institutionalization, and
electroshock therapy constitute persecution despite the intent to “cure” one of homosexuality).
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persecution where it produces “consequences of a substantially prejudicial
nature,” and includes pervasive restrictions which effectively proscribe an
individual’s right to mobility, to earn a living, or to access education.139 In
Europe, adjudicators examine these rights under the umbrella of Article 8 of
the ECHR which guarantees the right to private life. The House of Lords
interprets the right to private life as a “broad term not susceptible to
exhaustive definition,” but states that “Mental health must also be regarded
as a crucial part of private life associated with the aspect of moral integrity,”
and goes on to say that “Article 8 protects a right to identity and personal
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other
human beings and the outside world.”140 In Ex Parte Razgar, the UK
adjudicators listed the following questions to answer when considering
claims brought under Article 8:
1. Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public
authority with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect
for his private life?
2. If so, will such interference have consequences of such
gravity as potentially to engage the operation of article 8?
3. If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
4. If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others?
5. If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate
public end sought to be achieved?141
Their analysis can be analogized to the subsequent discussion of failure of
state protection and to the balancing of interests when considering asylum
claims brought on the basis of disability.

139

UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 82, ¶ 54.
Bensaid v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECHR 82, ¶ 47.
141 R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Department, ex parte Razgar, [2004] UKHL 27, United
Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial Committee), June 17, 2004, available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46c998742.html.
140
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3. Failure of State Protection/Reasonable Accommodation and the
Challenge of Budgetary Deference
The failure of state protection can be obvious and the result of clear
conduct or it may be subtle in which case it must be deduced from the
absence of certain conduct or from the actual effect when it differs from
intent. Obvious instances of failure of state protection include statesponsored or state-condoned mandatory institutionalization, which is seen as
a violation of the fundamental rights, an infringement on personal security
and, in certain cases, may amount to torture, cruel, and degrading treatment.
Failure of state protection can also arise from widespread discrimination and
the absence of adequate facilities and resources. Examples of cases which
illustrate failure of state protection are discussed below.
Documentation by non-governmental organizations has identified where
“treatment” and “protection” of persons with disabilities is degrading and
inhumane if not dangerous and life-threatening.142 For example, in Hungary,
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, cage beds were used as a form
of restraint in facilities warehousing children with disabilities.143 The use of
unmodified electric shock therapy, or ECT, with no anesthesia and no muscle
relaxants is prevalent in Bulgaria amongst other states.144 Such practices
most likely amount to torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.
These are clear instances in which failure of state protection is observed.
There is no universally mandated standard of life or a universally
prescribed role for governments to carry out their domestic duties with
regard to its citizenry.145 Yet the international community has adopted
minimum standards of behavior to comport with the basic rights (“including
freedom from interference and entitlements to resources”) which all states
are bound to ensure to all its citizens.146 Therefore, even in the voluntary
institutionalization of individuals can result in persecution when the state
fails to prevent harmful conditions from developing in health care facilities
and to curtail the harmful practices of medical and other care providers or to

142 Lord, supra note 14, at 30. See Mental Disability Advocacy Ctr., Cage Beds: Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Four EU Accession Countries 30–31 (2003),
available at http://www.mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Cage_Beds.pdf.
143 Id.
144 Symposium, International Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of Persons
with Mental Disabilities: The Case of Hungary, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339, 353
(2002).
145 HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 105 (citation omitted).
146
Id. at 106.
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mitigate cultural norms which result in the mal-treatment of institutionalized
persons.
Cultural norms and local custom play a powerful role in the treatment of
persons with disabilities. As Debra Benko and Brittany Benowitz describe,
“[i]n many parts of the world, persons with disabilities are still subjected to
long-term and even permanent institutionalization in psychiatric facilities
and social care homes, frequently in isolated environs within rural areas or
locations set apart from established communities.”147 Aside from depriving
individuals of enjoying their civil and political rights such as freedom of
movement and liberty, the living conditions in such locales expose
inhabitants to infectious diseases, poor hygiene, inadequate nutrition which
result in serious threats to life.148
Nearly every society in history has treated people with disabilities as
unwanted, undesirable, or dangerous, subjecting them to discrimination,
neglect, abuse, and even death.149 In a speech at New York Law School,
Professor Michael Perlin said:
Internationally there is a shameful history of human rights
abuses in psychiatric institutions: the provision of services in a
segregated setting that cuts people off from society, often for
life, the arbitrary detention from society that takes place when
people are committed to institutions without due process,
denial of a person’s ability to make choices about their life
when they are put under plenary guardianship, the denial of
appropriate medical care or basic hygiene in psychiatric
facilities, the practice of subjecting people to powerful and
dangerous psychotropic medication without adequate
standards, and the lack of human rights oversight and
enforcement mechanisms to protect them against the broad
range of abuses in institutions.150

147

See Lord, supra note 14, at 29 (citing Debra Benko & Brittany Benowitz, The
Application of Universal Human Rights Law to People with Mental Disabilities, 9 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 9, 11 (2001)).
148 Benko & Benowitz, supra note 147, at 10 (citing Armenian NGO which has documented
high mortality rates in such institutions).
149 Kanter & Dadey, supra note 134, at 1117 (citing ARLENE KANTER, TOWARD EQUALITY:
THE ADA’S ACCOMMODATION OF DIFFERENCES, IN DISABILITY DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL
CHANGE 228 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks eds., 1999)).
150 International Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of Persons with Mental
Disabilities: The Case of Hungary, supra note 144.
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Nevertheless, some progress and positive change is occurring, particularly
in Europe. Kanter & Dadey cite a case that was before the erstwhile
European Court of Human Rights which surprisingly found that the
“expulsion of an Algerian citizen who had lived in France since childhood
constituted a violation of his right to personal integrity and respect for family
life under the European Convention on Human Rights.”151 Most notably, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that “the position of
inferiority and powerlessness which is typical of patients in psychiatric
hospitals calls for increased vigilance . . . and forms of persecution can likely
be found even in the absence of explicit threats or physical harm, given the
quality inherent to the environment i.e. incapacitation and loss of
freedom.”152
Only about 40 of the 193 countries that are members of the UN have
enacted domestic disability laws.153 Additionally, of those, many continue to
rely on charity or medical models of disability and ignore the effects of
mistreatment, discrimination and exclusion of people with disabilities
themselves as well as on the societies in which they live.154
For instance, in an attempt to improve the quality of the population and
reduce the perceived burden of accommodating persons with disabilities in
Chinese society, China passed the Maternal and Infant Health Care Law in
1995.155 That year, China also purportedly spent roughly $138 million on
collectives for its orphans, disabled, elderly, and young persons. A closer
look at the actual effects of the legislation and at its budgetary allocation
should allow adjudicators to find a failure of state protection, even when
giving deference to governmental decision-making.156 In practice, the law
meant that when a child is born “inferior,” or with a mental disability, he/she
is unlikely to receive adequate quality of care and services, and worse,
151 Kanter & Dadey, supra note 134, at 1135 (citations omitted) (the case involved a deaf
and mute individual who the ECHR found would suffer total sensory deprivation if returned to
Algeria, which would constitute cruel and degrading treatment).
152 Id.
153 Some Facts About Persons with Disabilities, U.N., http://www.un.org/disabilities/conve
ntion/facts.shtml (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); see also Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and
Challenge of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 287, 309–13 (2007).
154 Kanter, supra note 153, at 291–92 (discussing the pitfalls of state’s relying on medical
models of disability and excluding certain individuals from protective laws).
155 Kanter & Dadey, supra note 134, at 1137 (citing Graciela Gomez, Comment, China’s
Eugenics Law as Grounds for Granting Asylum, 5 PAC. RIM. L. POL’Y J. 563, 563 (1996).
156 Lennie Magida, Population Pressures, Cultural Stigma Limit Lives of Mentally Retarded
People, HARTFORD COURANT, June 14, 1995, at AI (“By comparison, the budget for the state
of Connecticut’s Department of Mental Retardation for fiscal year 1995 was $545 million.”).
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persons with serous genetic defects were forced to undergo sterilization.157
Hospital administrators would only treat patients with at least a moderate IQ
due to the government’s objective to limit scarce resources to productive
members of society.158
Although not a state-sanctioned policy, in Japan, physicians forcibly
sterilized patients to prevent “undesirable pregnancies” in “mentally retarded”
women who were likely targets of molestation while institutionalized.159
Failure of state protection exists outside of Asia, in Europe and the Americas
as well. Disability Rights International has published reports and advocacy
pieces on the treatment of persons with disabilities in Hungary, Turkey, Serbia,
Argentina and Peru, amongst others.160
A Los Angeles Times article described the conditions of facilities in
Russia which seek to isolate children with mental disabilities who are
deemed “useless to society,” as “forgotten pockets of hell tucked away on
the concrete fringes of towns, behind walls and barbed-wire fences patrolled
by dogs,” and tells the story of twelve-year old Sasha.161 The article paints a
picture of watching Sasha, standing half-dressed in a corner, rhythmically
bashing his head against the wall, while nearby children in strait jackets were
tied to their iron beds and others lay in barred cots, flapping their arms and
legs.162 Such investigative reporting has consistently highlighted practices
that are widespread in states which have signed and ratified the CRPD.163
In addition to external systems of checks and balances, the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is a body of independent experts
charged with monitoring implementation of the Convention by the party
states. States are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee.164

157

Gomez, supra note 155, at 563.
Id.
159 Kanter & Dadey, supra note 134, at 1137–38 (citing Mentally Disabled Women’s Rights
Reviewed, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, June 19, 1993, available at LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File).
160 Our Reports & Publications, DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.Disabilityri
ghtsintl.org/Media-Gallery/Our-Reports-Publications/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
161 Kanter & Dadey, supra note 134, at 1139 (citing Vanora Bennett, Russia’s Forgotten
Children, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1997, at A1).
162 Id.
163 Both Mexico and Russia have signed and ratified the CRPD. Status: Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N.T.S., https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?s
rc=TREATY&mtdsg_no=iv-15&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
164 Committee on the Rights of Persons and Disabilities: Questions and Answers, OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Questi
onsAnswers.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) (“States must report initially within two years of
accepting the Convention and thereafter every four years. The Committee examines each
158
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Therefore, the CRPD’s own internal reporting and monitoring mechanisms
facilitate a showing of failure of state protection in the form of country
reports examination, and provide an added layer of evidentiary support for
asylum applications brought on the basis of disability.
C. Article 15 of the CRPD and States’ Non-refoulement Obligations
The Convention makes no reference to the right of persons with
disabilities to seek asylum nor does it make reference to the principle of non
refoulement,165 the obligation not to return a person to a State where he or
she is likely to be subjected to torture, however the anti-torture provisions of
the convention provide disability applicants with a last-resort, albeit one with
higher burdens of proof, when they are unable to persuade adjudicators of the
connection between persecution and one of the five nexus grounds in refugee
law.166 The Committee Against Torture has commented on the relationship
between the anti-torture provision (Article 15) of the CRPD with expulsion,
deportation, extradition, and related procedures, and has done so within the
framework of other human rights treaties (namely, Article 3 of the ICCPR),
rather than by reference to the jus cogens nature of the anti-torture
provisions.167 The Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment on
Article 7, provides a more universal endorsement of the anti-torture
provisions and emphasized that “[s]tates parties must not expose individuals
to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition,
expulsion or refoulement.”168 Issues of gender are also highly relevant to

report and shall make such suggestions and general recommendations on the report as it may
consider appropriate and shall forward these to the State Party concerned.”).
165 See Lord supra note 14, at 77.
166 Id. (citing GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 101) (defining the principle of non-refoulement to
mean that “no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face
persecution or torture”).
167 Id. (citing The Committee against Torture has on occasion reviewed communications
involving expulsion and deportation in the context of the anti-torture framework of the CAT).
See, e.g., Agiza v. Sweden, Decision of the Comm. Against Torture, Commc’n No. 233/2003,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/dec
isions/233-2003.html.
168 Lord, supra note 14, at 77 (citing Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20,
Article 7 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at
30 (1994)).
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any analysis, including the risk of gender-based violence which may
aggravate existing disabilities or result in secondary disabilities.169
According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s EOIR, the U.S. is obligated
under Article 3 of the CAT to
protect aliens from being returned to countries where they
would more likely than not face torture. Torture is defined, in
part, as severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) that is
intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official, or other person
acting in an official capacity.
Under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) §§ 101(a)(42), 208(b), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b), “applicants must establish that it is more
likely than not that they would be tortured if removed to a specific country,
noting that not all types of harm that qualify as persecution necessarily qualify
as torture,” but are not required to establish any nexus with the five protected
grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion), as is required for asylum or withholding of removal under
the INA. Furthermore, CAT protection may be granted to criminals, terrorists,
and persecutors unlike asylum or withholding from removal under the INA.
In determining whether grounds exist to believe an individual would be in
danger of being subjected to torture, state parties must consider “all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the state concerned
of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”170
The ECHR, which seems to have the most extensive case law on states’
anti-torture obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on
169 Id. (describing how gender-based violence impacting the risk of return would include,
among others, rape and other forms of sexual violence, such as female genital mutilation,
forced abortion, and forced sterilization). See Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Rep. on the Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, 32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3 ¶¶ 59–60 (2008), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GO8/101/61/PDF/G0810161.pdf; see also Mentally Disabled
Women’s Rights Reviewed, supra note 159 (on the forced sterilization of disabled women to
prevent conception following molestation).
170 CAT, supra note 18, art. 3. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32276,
THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY
CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 3 (2009), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awc
gate/crs/rl32276.pdf (“The [United States] State Department has interpreted the words ‘where
applicable’ to indicate that competent authorities must decide whether and to what extent
these considerations are a relevant factor in a particular case.”).
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Human Rights (relating to torture and non-refoulement), has widely
diverging decisions.171 For example, in D. v. United Kingdom, the ECHR
found that deporting a man in advanced stages of AIDS to his home in St.
Kitts constituted inhuman treatment on the basis of substandard medical
resources accessible to him there. However, in Salkic v. Sweden the ECHR
held that only exceptional humanitarian circumstances would entitle persons
otherwise subject to expulsion orders to continue benefitting from social,
medical and other services.172
However, using the CRPD, namely Article 15, a person with disability
(particularly a psychosocial disability) likely to “face involuntary treatment,
confinement, institutionalization or an equivalent medical practice in his/her
home country” can argue that removal will amount to torture, cruel and
inhuman treatment and a depravation of fundamental rights in violation of
Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.173
D. The Role of “Reasonable Accommodation” in Identifying Persecution
The main question for adjudicators to address is whether the harmful
conduct in question arises from more than a general lack of resources.174 In
implementing a human rights treaty, a budget analysis is required by the
committee enforcing and monitoring compliance with the treaty.175 For
example, the U.N. Economic and Social Council must perform a budgetary
analysis in the context of State reporting obligations on the implementation
of economic, social, and cultural rights in conjunction with the ICESCR.176
171 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 127, art. 3.
172 Lord, supra note 14, at 77–78 (in the latter case it was deemed that the Salkic family
could also have received treatment in their home country).
173 See id. at 78.
174 See INTERNATIONAL BUDGET PROJECT, DIGNITY COUNTS: A GUIDE TO USING BUDGET
ANALYSIS TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2004), available at http://internationalbudget.org/
wp-content/uploads/Dignity-Counts-A-Guide-to-Using-Budget-Analysis-to-Advance-HumanRights-English.pdf. Budget analysis refers to a process by which State allocation of resources
are scrutinized and assessed, for example, to identify sufficiency of resource allocation in the
attempt to secure the rights of a particularly disadvantaged group. See Maria Socorro I.
Diokno, A Rights-Based Approach to Budget Analysis 8 (1999), available at http://www.crin.
org/docs/resources/publications/hrbap/RBABudgetAnalysis.pdf.
175 INTERNATIONAL BUDGET PROJECT, supra note 174.
176 Id.; see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Limburg Principles on the Implementation of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, No. 79, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 (Jan. 8, 1987)
(“Quantitative information should be included in the reports of States Parties in order to
indicate the extent to which the rights are protected in fact. Statistical information and
information on budgetary allocations and expenditures should be presented in such a way as to
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The committee which enforces the CRPD will likely be charged with
performing a similar analysis which a domestic court can borrow from in
adjudicating asylum claims.
The CRPD defines a failure to make a reasonable accommodation as a
form of discrimination.177 The concept of reasonable accommodation did not
originate in the context of disability. The term reasonable accommodation
was originally employed in the United States, in the Civil Rights Act of 1968
in reference to discrimination on the grounds of religious practice. The Civil
Rights Act requires employers to “reasonably accommodate” an employee or
potential employee’s religious observance or practice unless an
accommodation would cause undue hardship on the employer’s business.178
The concept of reasonable accommodation was first applied to the disability
context in the United States Rehabilitation Act of 1973.179
Reasonable accommodation in the CRPD includes access to courts and
the ability for persons with disabilities to seek redress. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights states:
For rights to have meaning, effective remedies must be
available to redress violations. This requirement is implicit in
the Convention and consistently referred to in the context of
the other major human rights treaties. Administrative remedies
might in certain cases be adequate to vindicate rights. In other
cases, judicial protection of rights appears indispensable in
order to satisfy the requirement of the Convention, and should

facilitate the assessment of the compliance with Covenant obligations. States Parties should,
where possible, adopt clearly defined targets and indicators in implementing the Covenant.”).
177 Lisa Waddington, The Concepts of Disability and Reasonable Accommodation (Mar.
2010) (unpublished paper prepared for Maastricht University).
178 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.
179 U.N. General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of
Persons with Disabilities, The Concept of Reasonable Accommodation in Selected National
Disability Legislation, 7th Sess., Jan. 16–Feb. 3, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2006/CRP.1
available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7bkgrndra.htm.
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extend to economic, social and cultural rights, besides civil and
political rights.180
In the European Union, “reasonable accommodation recognizes the
relevance of ‘impairment’ — if one ignores the impact of an impairment, and
treats a person with a disability in exactly the same way as one treats a
person without a disability, a de facto situation of inequality will arise.”181
According to Sandra Fredman, “instead of requiring disabled people to
conform to existing norms, the aim is to develop a concept of equality which
requires adaptation and change.”182 Therefore adjudicators should take
account of the characteristics related to disability and accommodate them.183
While this is not limited to adapting a physical environment for the needs of
disabled persons, like physical adaptations, a balancing should be done by
adjudicators and courts to determine what costs and burdens will be involved
and to ensure that they are not disproportionate.184
Recital 21 of the EU’s Employment Equality Directive (2000/78)
describes the balancing test as follows: “To determine whether the measures
in question give rise to a disproportionate burden, account should be taken in
particular of the financial and other costs entailed, the scale and financial
resources of the organization or undertaken and the possibility of obtaining
public funding or any other assistance.”185
American courts have long since acknowledged the importance of access
to courts for persons with disabilities. In Tennessee v. Lane, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that under the Eighth Amendment “it is the
responsibility of the state to ensure access to the courts for people with
disabilities.”186 The case involved two paraplegics seeking damages and
equitable relief, “alleging that Tennessee and a number of its counties had

180 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9: The
Domestic Application of the Covenant ¶ 10, Dec. 3, 1999, E/C.12/1998/24, available at http://
www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079d6.html.
181 Waddington, supra note 177.
182 Sandra Fredman, Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination
Paradigm?, in DISABILITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Anna Lawson &
Caroline Gooding eds., 2005).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Waddington, supra note 177. See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, art. 12, 2000 O.J. (L
303) 17 (EU) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of disability); see also
Fredman, supra note 182.
186
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004).
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denied them physical access to that State’s courts in violation of Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). . . .”187
Before Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court decided, in Alabama v.
Garrett, that “Congress had acted unconstitutionally in granting citizens the
right to sue states for disability discrimination (such as the denial of
employment) under the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause.”188
However, the Court reasoned that Garrett did not apply to Lane because
Title II of the ADA dealt with the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the equal protection clause.189 Therefore, the Court found
that while Congress may not have had enough evidence of disability
discrimination to abrogate state sovereign immunity and allow suits against
states for equal protection claims, it did have enough evidence of due process
violations (such as non-handicap-accessible courthouses) to waive the
sovereign immunity doctrine in Lane.190 “The Court also emphasized that
the remedies required from the states were not unreasonable — they just had
to make reasonable accommodations to allow disabled persons to exercise
their fundamental rights.”191 Because Title II was a “reasonable prophylactic
measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end,” and because Congress had
the authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate the actions of the
states to accomplish that end, the law was constitutional.192
There, the individual plaintiff was not required to
‘overcome’ the alleged violations on their own, as the medical
model of disability (discussed below) would dictate; rather, to
the extent that society has established barriers preventing each
of the plaintiffs from realizing their rights, it became the
responsibility of society and ultimately the state to remove such
barriers and provide a remedy for violations of law.193

187

Id. at 509.
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Al. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530 (2004). Although the Court held that “one
particular individual had a right to physically access one particular court,” it left open “the
question of whether any other persons with disabilities could gain relief when denied access to
other justice elements, for example, as witnesses or jurors.” Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley
Stine, The Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 83 WASH. L. REV. 449, 479 (2008).
193
Kanter, supra note 58, at 460.
188
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The CRPD bolsters the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on accommodation and
“requires State Parties to identify and eliminate obstacles and barriers, in order
to ensure that persons with disabilities may access their environment,
transportation, public facilities, services, information, and communications.”194
Procedures for identifying persons with disabilities must be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the diversity of experiences where the definition of
disability is construed broadly.195 Crock, McCallum, and Ernst turn to the
International Association of Refugee Law Judges and its Judicial Guidelines
on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons (IARLJ Guidelines).196
According to the IARLJ Guidelines, “applicants or their representatives
should be given the opportunity to make submissions as to the nature of their
disability and its impact on the procedural and/or substantive aspects of their
claim,” including efforts for early identification and the openness to late
identification of disability in a case.197
Furthermore, given the high deference which adjudicators provide for
governmental decisions in resource-allocation, adjudicators should pay close
attention to governmental intent or the actual impact of governmental
decisions. In other words they should continue to “look beyond a State’s
notional willingness to protect persons with disabilities — expressed, for
example, through official policy—in order to assess whether effective
accommodations are made in practice.”198
Crock, McCallum, and Ernst cite a case concerning a Polish child with a
disability, where the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board looked
beyond documentary evidence to find that government intent and actions
were in fact lacking in providing adequate protection for children with
disability.199 In the absence of any mandatory child abuse reporting law it
was determined that the applicant had little recourse to protect himself in his
home state and therefore it was appropriate to rely on the protection of
international refugee law.200 This case illustrates the nature of state
protection, the failure of which is a necessary prerequisite to finding
persecution. If this standard had been used in the previously discussed case
of a deaf Liberian national, perhaps the U.K. adjudicators would not have
194

CRPD, supra note 17, art. 9.
Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 5.
196 Id. at 6 (citing International Association of Refugee Law Judges, Judicial Guidelines on
Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons: Physical disability, Guidance Note 9,
September 2008, ¶ 14).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 16.
199 Id.
200
Id. (citing LXC (Re), No. TAO-05472, CRRD No. 96 at 12 (May 30, 2001).
195
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found that the mere documentary evidence and past records prove the
existence of available assistance to deaf persons in Liberia.
An alternative to the human rights approach, is the CRPD’s social
construction of disability. The utility of this approach falls somewhere
between the medical and human rights approaches to understanding
disability. The social approach frames the applicant’s disability in terms of
how it impacts his/her civil and political rights, such as the right to be free of
discrimination or torture and also provides a ready link with one of the five
nexus grounds, membership in a particular social group (discussed below).
Threats to civil and political rights have historically secured more
sympathetic treatment in the hands of asylum adjudicators than socioeconomic rights such as the right to health or employment. The reason stems
from the prevalent idea that applicants who suffer at the hands of state or
non-state actors because of some innate condition are more deserving of
refugee status.201 Pursuant to this idea, such applicants are the proper
recipients of refugee protection, which is a measure of last resort.202 When
civil or political rights are threatened, the hardship involved is likely to be
deemed more than a mere lack of access to socio-economic resources, such
as adequate education or professional employment. Ultimately, however, the
social approach is better suited to showing the link between persecution and
membership in a particular social group. This is discussed further below.
V. PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES USING THE CRPD CLEARLY COMPRISE A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP UNDER THE REFUGEE DEFINITION
First is a description of various interpretations of “membership in a
particular social group,” followed by a closer look at a contemporary
interpretation, the “social visibility test.” Next is a discussion of the social
approach to disability and the role of the CRPD in complementing the social
visibility test.
A. Analyzing “Particular Social Group” Under Evolving Theories of
International Refugee Law
Considering an asylum applicant’s membership in a particular social group
is a relatively new idea in refugee and asylum law and is most often seen in the
common law jurisprudence of the United States, Australia, Canada, and the

201
202

HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 104–05.
Id.
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United Kingdom.203 Such membership as a reason for persecution was added
after the initial four grounds for seeking refugee status. Based on the travaux
preparatoires of the Refugee Convention the category of “particular social
group” was the last of the enumerated grounds, added, presumably with the
intent to broaden the scope of the other four grounds.204
There are multiple definitions of “particular social group” used by courts
and the Canadian Supreme Court in Canada v. Ward outlines the five main
approaches.205 The most restrictive, initially put forth by Guy Goodwin-Gill
in 1983, states that an individual’s membership in a “particular social group”
must be united by some religious, political, or national affiliation. This
essentially eliminates any broadening of the refugee definition from the
existing grounds of religion, nationality, or political opinion.
Arthur Helton proposed a less restrictive reading of “particular social
group” as a safety net that “could include all the bases for and types of
persecution which an imaginative despot might conjure up,” and in particular
anything that did not already fit under the existing four grounds.206 Critics
and courts discounted this reading as over-inclusive207 and tautological.208
A third conceptualization of social group is an intuitive approach that
urges against “attempts to formulate abstract definitions” and advocates the
recognition of particular social groups on a case by case basis instead.209
This approach relies on the experience of administrators and adjudicators to

203

Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985); Applicant “A.” and Another v. Minister
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another, High Court of Australia, 1997. 190 CLR 225;
142 ALR 331; Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R., File No.: 21937, March 25,
1993; Shah & Islam v. Home Department, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (U.K. House of Lords).
204 Applicant “A.” and Another v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another,
High Court of Australia, 1997. 190 CLR 225; 142 ALR 331 (per Justice McHugh).
205 Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689.
206 Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q.
213, 242 (1995) (citing Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social
Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 45 (1983)).
207 Applicant “A.” and Another v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another,
High Court of Australia, 1997. 190 CLR 225; 142 ALR 331 (“If they had intended to provide
a ‘catch-all . . .’ it is more likely than not that they would have amended the draft treaty by
eliminating the specified grounds of persecution. Indeed, if the drafters had intended the term
‘a particular social group’ to act as a ‘catch-all’, it is surprising that they did not amend the
Convention to provide that any person who had a well-founded fear of persecution was a
refugee.”).
208 An “association of people as a ‘particular social group’ merely by virtue of their common
victimization as the objects of persecution, rendering any additional grounds for persecution
useless.” Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689.
209 Applicant “A.” and Another v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another,
High Court of Australia, 1997. 190 CLR 225; 142 ALR 331 (opinion of J. Kirby).
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guide the decision making process and help identify persecution when they
see it.210 Consequently, this approach is criticized for its lack of common
and consistent standards and for the potential margin for error in judicial
review and legal adjudication.211
The most common and universal means for identifying a social group is
the doctrine of ejusdem generis,212 or ‘immutable characteristics,’
approach—first described in the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)’s
landmark decision Matter of Acosta and later elucidated by James
Hathaway.213 The doctrine finds an immutable common characteristic as the
basis of membership in a social group. It was first adopted by the United
States, and subsequently by several other common law jurisdictions.
Applied to interpret the phrase “persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group,” the doctrine refers to treatment of an individual
member of a group of persons who share a common, immutable
characteristic (which in turn defines that group), and whose group members
cannot or should not change that trait because of its fundamental relationship
to their individual identities or conscience.214 The immutable characteristics
approach to social group analysis can be problematic in the disability context
where persons with certain physical or mental impairments do not selfidentify as “disabled.” However, with the addition of the “social perception”
or “social visibility” requirement, persons with disabilities who do not
identify as such may still satisfy the doctrinal requirements for membership
in a particular social group, as will be seen in subsequent discussion.
Using the underlying theme of non-discrimination and respect for human
rights, courts further subdivide three possible categories of social groups
based on the ejusdem generis principle. The first category is defined by an
innate or unchangeable characteristic; courts have considered gender, sexual
orientation, linguistic background, and family ties as examples. Second are
groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to
their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association.
210

Id.
Id. (opinion of J. Gummow) (“Such propositions appear to abandon the quest for
standards by which administrative decisions may determine the fate of individuals and in
respect of the application of which there is judicial review for error or law.”).
212 HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 104–05 (“General words used in an enumeration with
specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific words.”). Here
ejusdem generis is used to describe what others may refer to as immutable characteristics
approach or protected characteristics.
213 Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985); HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 104–05.
214 Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985); Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward,
[1993] 2 S.C.R., File No.: 21937 (Mar. 25, 1993).
211
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One example are groups united by cultural affiliation or union membership.
The third category includes groups associated by a former voluntary status
that the group’s members cannot alter due to their historical permanence.
This would include social origin or “past status,” such as Holocaust
survivors, for example.215
Groups that are excluded from the ejusdem generis classification are
groups defined by characteristics which are changeable or from which
disassociation is possible as long it does not require renunciation of basic
human rights (typically groups based on occupation or profession, such as
teachers or scientists).216 Although socio-economic class seems to fall
outside the aegis of particular social group, poverty may qualify because
poverty cannot always voluntarily be given up. For example, “where the
poor are forced to remain poor by the state or particular system, thereby
suffering ‘substantial economic disadvantage’ there may be exceptions to the
general exclusion of economically motivated groups.”217 Situations where
“an individual’s ‘job’ is based on his or her membership in a particular
‘caste’ (a concept which blurs the traditional distinctions between religion,
social mores and economic classes) would also challenge a strict and narrow
interpretation of the terms immutable or voluntary.”218
In recent times a new approach termed “social visibility” has been
introduced in U.S. jurisprudence and has been the basis of some debate.219
This new trend may have far-reaching consequences for applicants with
disabilities and will be examined in further detail in subsequent sections.
A precursor of the social visibility standard, another popular
conceptualization for social group was pioneered by the Australian Federal
Court, described in Ward as one of the five original constructions of
“particular social group,” and termed the “social perception” test:
To determine that a particular social group exists, the putative
group must be shown to have the following features. First,
there must be some characteristic other than persecution or the
fear of persecution that unites the collection of individuals;
persecution or fear of it cannot be a defining feature of the
215

Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R., File No.: 21937 (Mar. 25, 1993).
Cheung v. M.E.I., [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (C.A.).
217 HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 104–05.
218 Id.
219 Kristin A. Bresnahan, Note, The Board of Immigration Appeals’s New Social Visibility
Test for Determining Membership of a Particular Social Group in Asylum Claims and Its
Legal and Policy Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649, 650 (2011).
216
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group. Second, the characteristic must set the group apart, as a
social group, from the rest of the community. Third, there
must be recognition within the society that the collection of
individuals is a group set apart from the rest of the
community.220
The general principle is not that the group must be recognized or
perceived within the society, but rather that the group must be distinguished
from the rest of society, and this serves as evidence.221 Another way to
construe the social perception concept is to see it as a means to restrict the
scope of the groups described if the ejusdem generis doctrine were used
exclusively. For example, based on the immutable characteristic of being
female, women would readily comprise a particular social group under the
ejusdem generis approach. However, when social perception is introduced
into the equation, women on the whole are less likely to be set apart from the
rest of the community and even if they were, society at large is not likely to
perceive them as a distinct and different entity. Some courts adopt the
immutable characteristics approach found in Acosta and reject the
cohesiveness requirement while warning that the group cannot be defined
solely by the fact that they are persecuted.222 However, the actions of
persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the creation of a particular
social group—for example left handed people who are persecuted form a
group because of their left-hand commonality.223 Despite the Acosta
opinion, the U.S. stance on social perception remained unclear, with the
Ninth Circuit continuing to require cohesiveness, cooperation, or
interdependence in order to find the existence of a social group.224
The fifth and final approach outlined by Ward was essentially the
UNHRC’s solution to conceptualizing membership in a particular social

220 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Zamora (1998) 51 ALD 1 (Austl.)
(interpreting test earlier defined the by the High Court of Australia in Applicant “A.” and
Another v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another (1997) 190 CLR 225
(Austl.)).
221 Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] HCA 25
(Austl.).
222 Acosta seems to accept the immutable characteristics or “a characteristic that is either
beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or
conscience that it ought not be required to be changed” to demonstrate that an applicant is a
“member of a group of persons all of whom share a common immutable characteristic”
(impliedly) do not need cohesiveness. 19 I&N Dec. 211.
223 Shah & Islam v. Home Department, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (U.K. House of Lords).
224
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
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group was to reconcile the two dominant global approaches and combine the
immutable characteristics doctrine and the social perception test.225
B. A Closer Look at the Social Visibility Test and Its Impact on Applicants
With Disabilities
For persons with disabilities, a common problem arises from defining the
nexus ground using the persecution which he/she faced, which leads to a
circular definition (e.g., applicant is persecuted because of his disability and
therefore the nexus ground is membership in a particular social group that is
defined in terms of the persecution) rather than simply linking the two.226
This section will argue that the new social visibility test which has been
criticized by jurists for its departure from precedent without explanation and
by human rights activists as increasing the burden on asylum seekers, will
actually serve the interests of persons with disabilities seeking asylum due to
the CRPD’s conceptualization of disability as a social phenomenon.
The social visibility test originated in the BIA, the “highest administrative
body for interpreting and applying immigration laws,” whose word binds all
immigration judges unless overruled by the Attorney General or a federal
court.227 In the past few years, the BIA has altered its long-standing stance
on recognizing particular social group on the basis of immutable
characteristics by introducing the requirement for group characteristics to be
socially visible. While the BIA is well within its mandate to amend its
definition of particular social group, as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has stated, it may not act “arbitrarily” by departing from “its established
precedents without announcing a principled reason for its decision.”228
However, there continues to be a split of authority amongst federal courts of
appeal in the United States as to the social visibility test.
225

UNHCR Guidelines on Membership in a Particular Social Group, HCR/GIP/02/02, May
7, 2002 [UNHCR Guidelines], ¶¶ 9–11 (“Analyses under the two approaches may frequently
converge. This is so because groups whose members are targeted based on a common
immutable or fundamental characteristic are also often perceived as a social group in their
societies. But at times the approaches may reach different results. For example, the social
perception standard might recognize as social groups associations based on a characteristic
that is neither immutable nor fundamental to human dignity—such as, perhaps, occupation or
social class. . . .” The UNHCR Guidelines goes on to define particular social group as: “a
group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted,
or who are perceived as a group by society.”).
226 Id.
227 See generally Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
228
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attn’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011).
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Between 1985 and 2006, most U.S. asylum adjudicators used Acosta’s
immutable characteristic approach as the primary test for deciding asylum
claims based on membership of a particular social group.229 In Acosta the
Second Circuit stated that in order for membership in a particular social
group to exist:
An individual must be a member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past
experience such as former military leadership or land
ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic that will
qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a
case-by-case basis.
However, whatever the common
characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences. Only when this is the case does the
mere fact of group membership become something comparable
to the other four grounds of persecution under the Act, namely,
something that either is beyond the power of an individual to
change or that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience
that it ought not be required to be changed.230
Tellingly, there is no requirement that the shared characteristic (whether
innate or otherwise) be outwardly visible to society at large. In Acosta, the
Second Circuit found that the applicant, whose claim was based on his
membership in the group of taxi drivers who refused to comply with
guerrilla-led work stoppages in San Salvador, was undeserving of refugee
status because he could change and could be required to change his
profession or non-conformist behavior.231 In other words his shared
characteristic was not deemed fundamental.
Since Acosta, the BIA has introduced the social visibility requirement in
In re C-A- and In re A-M-E-. In C-A- the BIA addressed the question of
whether “noncriminal informants constitute a ‘particular social group’ ” and
found that the applicants, who were voluntary informants and feared harm at
the hands of the Cali cartel, did not comprise a particular social group
229
230
231

Bresnahan, supra note 219, at 661.
Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 235 (B.I.A. 1985) (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
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because “an informant against the Cali cartel intends to remain unknown and
undiscovered,” and “when considering the visibility of groups of confidential
informants, the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it is generally
out of the public view.”232 Therefore, the applicants failed the social
visibility test that is an important element in identifying the existence of a
particular social group. In this way the BIA implies that it is not enough for
an individual to self-identify but that his/her membership needs social
endorsement; similarly it is not enough for society to recognize the existence
of a group but rather it must recognize the existence of the group and an
individual’s membership within it.233
Although the BIA describes the social visibility test as stemming from the
UNHCR and Refugee Convention and Protocol, it is arguably inconsistent
with existing law.234 The UNHCR Guidelines prescribe an either/or
approach to demonstrating membership in a particular social group235 while
the BIA conflates the two approaches and requires a two-part showing of
membership in a particular social group (part one being the existence of an
immutable characteristic and part two being the visibility of that immutable
characteristic).236
Yet, the test would not necessarily preclude applicants with disabilities
from seeking asylum on the basis of their membership in a particular social
group. For instance, using the social definition of disability, even the
strictest adherents of the social visibility requirement would be satisfied
because the very existence of the disability is understood and characterized
in societal terms, or in terms of what it means to society, and how others
react to it. Short of being card-carrying members of the social group, such
individuals would satisfy the tests laid out in both BIA decisions, In re C-Aand In re A-M-E-. However, using the medical definition of disability could
create difficulty in showing the existence of a social group using the social
visibility test since the medical needs of the individual, while being clearly
identifiable, and documented (by doctors, psychiatrists, employers etc.) may
not be readily apparent to others. Examining the BIA’s list of examples in
which the social visibility test was satisfied, it seems to conflate the innate
characteristics test with social visibility. For instance, in Matter of
Kasinga,237 the BIA found that women in the “Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe of
232
233
234
235
236
237

23 I&N Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
Bresnahan, supra note 219, at 660.
In re C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006).
UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 225.
Bresnahan, supra note 219, at 661.
In re Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
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northern Togo who did not undergo female genital mutilation as practiced by
that tribe and who opposed the practice” comprised a particular social
group—it can be argued that individuals with non-physical disabilities are
just as “visible” as a woman who has resisted genital mutilation in Togo.238
In that instance, even the medical definition of disability could aid in proving
social group membership. In Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, the BIA recognized
homosexuals in Cuba to comprise a particular social group despite the
deliberate lack of social visibility of such individuals in their home
country.239 Similarly, in Matter of Fuentes the BIA recognized that former
taxi drivers comprised a particular social group, although such a group
lacked “particularity” and “social visibility” in society.240
In A-M-E-, the BIA held that the applicants failed to “establish that their
status as affluent Guatemalans gave them sufficient social visibility to be
perceived as a group by society or that the group was defined with adequate
particularity to constitute a particular social group,” and stated that the
Immigration Judge “correctly applied the Matter of Acosta framework . . . in
determining that the proposed group of ‘wealthy’ Guatemalans is not so
readily ‘identifiable’ . . . as to meet the requirements of a particular social
group within the meaning of the refugee definition.” However, the Acosta
framework did not include the “identifiable” requirement. The BIA notes
that
in appropriate circumstances, “wealth” may be a shared
characteristic of a social group. For example, should a
government institute a policy of imprisoning and mistreating
persons with assets or income above a fixed level, there could
be a basis for a societal perception that the class of wealthy
persons, as defined by the government, would constitute a
particular social group,241
but even in that instance there is no ready explanation as to how an
individual member of the “class of wealthy persons, as defined by the
government,” would be identified by the average person in society

238
239
240
241

In re C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 955 (B.I.A.).
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I.&N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
Matter of Fuentes, 20 I&N Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 1991).
In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69, 75 (B.I.A. 2007).
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In 2008, the BIA took the suggestions outlined in In re C-A- and made
them requirements in a gang-related asylum claim.242 Several U.S. circuit
courts have applied the two-pronged test laid out in Matter of S-E-G- looking
for “social visibility” and “particularity.”243 Amidst a split of authority
between circuits, and a challenge before the Supreme Court, it remains to be
seen whether the BIA’s new requirements and the departure from the Acosta
standard should be afforded deference by U.S. courts.
C. Using the CRPD’s Social Model of Defining Disability to Show
Membership in a “Particular Social Group”
Whether the adjudicating body relies on the immutable characteristics
approach, the social perception test, social visibility or a combination
thereof, the CRPD’s conceptual and practical treatment of the term
“disability” will enable persons with disability to demonstrate their
membership in a particular social group with greater ease.
1. Historic Debate
Article 1 which proclaims the purpose of the CRPD states that “Persons
with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers
may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis
with others.”244 Whether disability is properly viewed as an “innate or
unchangeable characteristic” is an issue that is open to debate. In the case of
X v. Canada,245 Canadian adjudicators granted the claim of a disabled Polish
child who could not “communicate effectively except through sign language”
and whose condition was deemed “permanent and unchangeable,” and thus
consistent with Ward’s conceptualization of particular social

242

Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting proposed groups of
“Salvadorean youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by the MS-13 gang and
who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on their own personal, moral, and
religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities” and “the family members of such
Salvadorean youth”).
243 The social visibility requirement has been rejected by some appellate courts since Matter
of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008). See Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir.
2009); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attn’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011).
244 CRPD, supra note 17, art. 1.
245 Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 16–17 (citing X v Canada (Immigration and
Refugee Board) (2001) CanLII 26953 (IRB), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/
doc/2001/2001canlii26953/2001canlii26953.html).
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group.246 Relying on the (arguably dated) medical approach to disability, “it
reasoned that, since the relevant disability was an “innate or unchangeable
characteristic,” the boy fell within the first of the three categories of
particular social group set out in Canada v. Ward.”247 Interestingly, the
Immigration and Refugee Board stated that the child’s disability was
“publicly obvious since he is unable to control the XXXX,248 which afflict
him,” but seems to have noted this fact as means of bolstering the credibility
of the child’s claim and as an evidentiary tool rather than as an element that
must be satisfied for a showing of membership in a social group.249 In other
words, the Board was not looking to satisfy a social visibility test.
As discussed previously, the various conceptualizations of disability (e.g.,
medical, social) may have an impact on the viability of a claim brought on
the basis of membership in a particular social group involving disability.
The CRPD defines persons with disabilities as including those who have
impairments that are “long-term.”250 Using the CRPD and viewing
impairment in societal terms, the immutable characteristics or ejusdem
generis test previously described, would be satisfied in showing membership
in a particular social group. Using the social approach suggests that it is the
impairment, not the disability, that is properly characterized as immutable,
regardless of whether it is short-term or permanent. This model distances
disability from stigma while still satisfying the particular social group
requirement of refugee law. Furthermore, this model allows adjudicators to
automatically read in an external behavioral element (whether it is mere
discrimination, serious harm or persecution), that converts impairment into
disability. Thus, identifying a person as disabled, effectively identifies both
an immutable characteristic that forms the basis of his/her membership in a
particular social group and has the potential to simultaneously identify
persecution.
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X v Canada (Immigration and Refugee Board) (2001) CanLII 26953 (IRB), available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2001/2001canlii26953/2001canlii26953.html.
247 Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 30, at 16 (citing Canada (Attorney General) v
Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739, 744.
248 The opinion uses this designation to protect the applicant’s privacy.
249 X v Canada (Immigration and Refugee Board) (2001) CanLII 26953 (IRB), available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2001/2001canlii26953/2001canlii26953.html.
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2. Showing Nexus Between Persecution and Membership in a Particular
Social Group
In an Australian case of a Mongolian national the adjudicator accepted
that “ ‘people with disabilities’ constitute a ‘particular social group’ in
Mongolia for the purposes of the Refugee Convention,” and relied upon “all
of the evidence including relevant information regarding legal, social,
cultural and religious norms in the country,” and materials such as the U.S.
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for any given
country.251 Yet in many instances the difficulty in showing membership in a
particular social group and in showing how persecution arises from
membership in a particular social group can prove insurmountable.
How does disability relate to the social visibility test? While some argue
that persons with disability are deemed to be non-contributing members of
society and thus forced into the outside fringes and treated as second-class
citizens, it is that very marginalization which causes them to comprise a
particular social group. In other words, the “invisibility of disabled people as
subjects of human rights and equality law” is what enables them to pass the
test of social visibility.252 Under the social approach to understanding
disability, society’s response (in the form of discrimination, marginalization,
abuse, cruel or degrading treatment, and in some instances even death) to an
individual’s impairment is the focus rather than the impairment itself. The
main issue then becomes how to show particularity, or that the individual
fears persecution that is somehow specific to him/herself and not one that is
generally feared by all members or the majority of society.
In the case of a Jordanian national, the application was rejected by the
Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia because, although disability services
in Jordan were “poor,” “limited,” “negligent” and discriminatory, it was the
product of limited government resources, which would affect all citizens and
was not unique to the applicant.253
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RRT Case No. 1002307, [2010] RRTA 532 (July 5, 2010), available at http://www.unhc
r.org/refworld/docid/4c84c7a72.html.
252 Anna Lawson, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: New Era or False Dawn?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 563, 584 (2007).
253 Crock, Ernst & McCallum, supra note 77, at 17 (citing 0907687, [2010] RRTA 45,
¶¶ 87–91, 93 (Member Leehy)).

2014]

THE CRPD AND ITS IMPACT ON REFUGEE AND ASYLUM LAW

741

VI. CONCLUSION
Using a human rights framework to adjudicate asylum claims offers many
benefits, including greater uniformity and consistency of outcomes across
jurisdictions. Within the human rights framework, the CRPD provides
crucial guidance for adjudicators on applications concerning persons with
disabilities. The CRPD offers applicants with disabilities a more precise and
clear map with which to navigate the complexities of the asylum process in a
given state. First, the CRPD makes the showing of a well-founded fear of
persecution more accessible to persons who may otherwise have faced unfair
and unique challenges to such an evidentiary standard. Second, the CRPD
allows applicants with disabilities to more easily identify as a particular
social group, and to mitigate some of the challenges presented by cultural
variations in perception. This also allows them to link the persecution they
experience to a Refugee Convention category.
Fear of “opening the floodgates” to a deluge of new applicants seeking
asylum on the basis of suffering persecution for their disabilities is an
unfounded policy concerns. Indeed, as Michelle Foster points out, such an
argument lacks any legal basis and several common law jurisdictions make it
clear that the administrative problem presented by increased applications
cannot justify adopting “artificial and inhuman criteria in an attempt to solve
it.”254 Furthermore, in the absence of a drastic modification of the Refugee
Convention, a successful applicant must demonstrate a sufficiently serious
harm that amounts to persecution, and must link that harm to a Refugee
Convention ground—neither are easy feats. Foster argues that this will
continue to exclude a broad range of claims, “most obviously where the
applicant cannot differentiate his or her situation from that of the general
population in the home state.”255 Thus the distinction between refugee and
migrant remains secure.
The “floodgates” argument assumes that all those who satisfy the Refugee
Convention definition will actually flee their home states to seek protection
elsewhere.256 Statistics show that relatively few people do so in reality.257
254

Michelle Foster, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: REFUGE
DEPRIVATION 344 (2011) (citing R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex
parte Jeyakumaran, [1994] Imm. AR 45 at 48; Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, Canada: Supreme Court, 19 October 1995; Applicant “A.”
and Another v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another, High Court of
Australia, 1997. 190 CLR 225; 142 ALR 331 (opinion of Gummow, J.)).
255 Id. at 345.
256 Id.
257
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For example, the same concern was raised by asylum adjudicators and
sovereign states when the global community formally began recognizing
gender-related persecution (such as female genital mutilation, forced
marriage, and domestic and sexual violence) as a legitimate basis for
asylum.258 Despite the fact that half the global population is female and a
significant percentage of women are oppressed, only a small population
seeks asylum overseas—even in the face of highly publicized protections for
refugees fleeing gender-based persecution.259
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security noted in 2009 that accepting
the possible existence of a “particular social group” that could render some
victims of domestic violence eligible for asylum “does not mean, however,
that every victim of domestic violence would be eligible for asylum. As with
any asylum claim, the full range of generally applicable requirements for
asylum must be satisfied.”260 Like the United States, other states that grant
asylum to women fleeing gender-related persecution “report similar
experiences: low numbers, small percentages, and no surge of claims.”261
It is therefore unlikely that using a human rights framework and the
CRPD in the asylum process and recognizing persons with disabilities as a
discrete and particular social group, will have an unduly burdensome effect
on the number of applications from persons with disabilities.262
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Id.
Jeanne Smoot, The Truth Trickles Out: There’s No Reason to Fear a “Flood” of Women
Asylum-seekers (unpublished paper prepared for Tahirih Justice Center, April 2010) (on file
with author) (citing Questions and Answers on the R-A- Rule, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, INS, 4
(Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/R-A-Rule_120700.pdf
(“Although genital mutilation is practiced on many women around the world, INS has not
seen an appreciable increase in the number of claims based on FGM [(female genital
mutilation)] since such claims were first recognized as a legitimate basis for asylum in 1996”
and also anticipating that “recognizing domestic violence as a possible basis for asylum would
not result in a surge of such claims”).
260 Id. (citing DHS Supplemental Brief, Matter of Anon 12–13 (Apr. 13, 2009)).
261 Smoot, supra note 259 (citations omitted).
262 Further discussion on the concerns over increased applications as a result of recognizing
persons with disabilities as a particular social group in forthcoming article.
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